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CONFUSING PURSUITS: SACRAMENTO V. LEWIS
AND THE FUTURE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS IN THE EXECUTIVE SETTING
Matthew D. Umhofer*
It thus appears that the Constitution does not constrain
police officers when conducting a high-speed car chase.
The decision of the court today will have the practical effect
of immunizing reckless police conduct from all strictures of
the Constitution, so long as no search or seizure occurs.
- Judge Robert E. Cowen'
The motorcycle raced along the residential streets, its
screaming engine shattering the silence of the warm spring
evening. The crescendo of a wailing siren followed close
behind, as the police cruiser raced along in pursuit. The
motorcycle, bearing two young, helmetless passengers,
hurtled past thirty miles per hour speed limit signs at speeds
of up to one-hundred miles per hour, running red lights,
weaving through traffic, and forcing two cars and a bicyclist
off the road.
Undeterred, the motorcycle accelerated and disappeared
over a hill. The cruiser sped up and crested the hill.
Suddenly, just over the incline, the motorcycle came into
view-it was lying on its side in the middle of the road, the
passenger standing over it. The brakes of the police cruiser
screeched, but it was too late. The car slammed into young
Philip Lewis and flung him nearly seventy feet, killing him
* J.D., Georgetown University; B.A., University of Notre Dame. The
author is a law clerk to the Honorable Lowell A. Reed, Jr., U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1999-2001, and Ferdinand F.
Fernandez, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 2001-2002. The author would like
to thank Professor Karen Blum and Professor Howard Wasserman for their
wise and patient guidance, and to Andrew Simons for the dialogue that inspired
this article.
1. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1319 (3d Cir. 1994).
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instantly.
The chase was over. But the case had just begun.
Eight years later, the Supreme Court of the United
States turned its attention to the death of Philip Lewis. In
County of Sacramento v. Lewis,' a case brought by Philip's
parents against the County of Sacramento and the officer at
the wheel of the police cruiser, the Court unanimously
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendants. In so doing, the Court resolved a
question that it had long avoided by setting a minimum
threshold of culpability for cases alleging substantive
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment by executive branch
officials. The Court concluded that in cases involving
executive (rather than legislative) action, "the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause is violated ... only
when it 'can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or
conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense."'3 In a high-
speed police pursuit, the Court held, the conduct of a police
officer will shock the conscience only when the police officer
acts with intent to injure.4
The decision, however, was not nearly as simple as it first
sounds. A glance beneath the glassy surface of Justice David
Souter's majority opinion reveals severe and conflicting
undercurrents that muddy the waters of the Court's facially
unanimous vote. In five concurring opinions, the Justices
differed sharply over the meaning and significance of the
Court's decision and presented divergent approaches to
substantive due process in the executive setting.
The most bitter divide in Lewis came between Justice
Souter's "shock the conscience" majority opinion and Justice
Antonin Scalia's concurrence. Concurring in the judgment,
Justice Scalia ridiculed the "shocks the conscience" test and
argued that both executive and legislative conduct should be
governed by the same analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment: the test set forth in Washington v. Glucksberg5
2. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
3. Id. at 847 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992)).
4. See id. at 849.
5. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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that focuses on whether the right asserted by the plaintiff
was apparent in the nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices.6  Justice Anthony Kennedy, joined by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, sought to steer a middle course
between Justice Souter and Justice Scalia.7
The result was a decision that sowed more problems than
it solved. Lewis failed to bring clarity to the substantive due
process analysis in the executive setting, and has created real
confusion among the lower courts. More importantly, the
divergent analyses set forth in both the majority opinion and
in Justice Scalia's concurrence are seriously flawed and set
nearly insurmountable hurdles for plaintiffs seeking the
protection of substantive rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
This article attempts to unpack the Supreme Court's
decision in Lewis and place it in context with the Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence. In so doing, this
article exposes serious flaws not only in the majority opinion
but in the concurrences as well and explains the confusion
Lewis sought to alleviate, yet only exacerbated.
Part I of this article reviews the history of the case and
briefly describes the decision in Lewis. Part II explores the
serious shortcomings of the majority opinion in Lewis.
Particularly problematic is the Court's reliance on its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence and the shocks the conscience test,
a standard with a dubious background and a host of critics.
Moreover, in its efforts to distinguish when police pursuit
cases come under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
the Court produced a result under which a police pursuit that
results in an injury to a fleeing suspect may never violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Part III exposes the weaknesses of Justice Scalia's
concurrence in the judgment. Justice Scalia argued that both
executive and legislative conduct should be considered under
a unified Fourteenth Amendment analysis that focuses on
history and tradition. His approach, however, had scant
support in precedent and failed to address the inherent
6. See id. at 710.
7. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 856-58 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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differences between executive and legislative conduct that
make distinct analyses for executive and legislative conduct
necessary.
Part IV describes the perplexing effect of Justice
Kennedy's concurrence, which attempted to draw on both the
majority opinion and Justice Scalia's concurrence. Providing
two key votes for the majority opinion in Lewis, Justice
Kennedy's concurrence authoritatively undermined the
majority and opened the door for courts to effectively choose
between the majority opinion and Justice Scalia's
concurrence.
Part V captures the confusion among the lower courts in
the wake of Lewis. Unsure whether to apply the majority,
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, or Justice Scalia's
concurrence, lower courts have already begun to struggle in
their analysis of substantive due process cases since Lewis.
The lower courts' confusion with Lewis underscores the
problems within the decision and the need for a solution.
Part VI provides a solution. By applying a strict
deliberate indifference standard to all executive substantive
due process cases, the Court could have avoided the quagmire
of the shocks the conscience test and brought clarity to an
area of the law that desperately needed it. By going another
route, the Court added fuel to the fires of contention over
substantive due process and perpetuated the state of
constitutional disarray that has reigned under the
Fourteenth Amendment for entirely too long.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Chase
The chase that sparked the controversy in Lewis began
innocently enough. On the evening of May 22, 1990, James
Everitt Smith, a Sacramento County Sheriffs Deputy, and
Murray Stapp, a local police officer, had just finished
breaking up a fight.8 As the officers returned to their cars
around 8:30 p.m., two teenaged boys, who were not involved
8. See Brief for Respondents at 1, Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 835
(1998) (No. 96-1337).
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in the earlier altercation, sped toward the officers on a
motorcycle and exchanged words with Stapp.9 Stapp ran his
overhead lights and attempted to block the passage of the
motorcycle, but the two boys eluded him and sped away."
Deputy Smith then executed a three-point turn, and the
chase was on.
During the seventy-five second pursuit, the motorcycle
ran four red lights, made three ninety-degree turns, and
nearly collided with two cars and a bicyclist over 1.3 miles.11
Deputy Smith estimated he was as close as 100-150 feet from
the motorcycle during the chase. Experts later determined
that at the speed Deputy Smith was traveling, it would have
taken his vehicle 650 feet to stop. 2
Just over the hill, as the motorcycle driver attempted to
execute a sharp turn, the brakes of the motorcycle had locked.
It slid out from under the youths and skidded to a halt in the
middle of the street.13 Seconds later, Deputy Smith crested
the hill at sixty-five miles per hour and saw the crashed
motorcycle. The police car skidded 147 feet, slamming into
sixteen-year-old Philip Lewis at forty miles per hour."
Smith's car careened off the road, eventually stopping in a
residential front yard after knocking over a mailbox." Lewis
suffered massive internal injuries and a fractured skull and
was pronounced dead at the scene. 6
The driver of the motorcycle, Brian Willard, who had
suffered no major injuries, fled the scene and eventually pled
no-contest to felony hit-and-run, failing to stop for a police
officer, and fleeing an accident that resulted in death. 7
B. The Case
The parents of Philip Lewis brought suit against Deputy
9. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836.
10. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 8, at 1.
11. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 837.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Lewis v. Sacramento, 98 F.3d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1996).
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See Herbert A. Sample, Court to Rule on Suit Over Police Chase,
SACRAMENTO BEE, June 3, 1997, at B1.
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Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriffs Department, and the
County of Sacramento under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
the defendants violated Philip Lewis' right to bodily integrity
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The case was filed in the Sacramento County Superior
Court, but was removed to federal court. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the
Lewises' § 1983 claims.8 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, however, reversed the district court's decision on the
issue of Deputy Smith's qualified immunity. The court of
appeals held that "'[blare' gross negligence is never sufficient
to sustain a § 1983 claim for a substantive due process
violation. It is also clear that deliberate indifference is
always sufficient." 9 Applying its deliberate indifference
analysis to the facts in Lewis, the court of appeals concluded
that plaintiffs had produced sufficient evidence to survive
summary judgment on the question of whether Deputy Smith
was deliberately indifferent. The court noted a number of
facts that demonstrated Deputy Smith's deliberate
indifference for the boys' due process rights to life and
personal security: the boys had neither violated a law nor
given the police a reason to stop them before the chase began,
the boys were on a motorcycle without helmets, the chase
took place at night in a residential area at speeds of up to
one-hundred miles per hour, and Deputy Smith crested a hill
at sixty-five miles per hour despite the fact that he could not
see over it." The defendants appealed the Ninth Circuit's
18. The district court concluded that Deputy Smith was entitled to qualified
immunity because the right asserted by the plaintiffs was not clearly
established. The court also held that the plaintiffs' claim against the sheriffs
department on a failure to train theory was not supported by the evidence. The
court also concluded that municipal liability did not lie with the sheriffls
department, because its pursuit policy was not so inadequate that the sheriffs
department was deliberately indifferent in maintaining it.
19. Lewis, 98 F.3d at 440 (citing L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir.
1996)).
20. Having concluded that plaintiffs had shown a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Deputy Smith's conduct amounted to a constitutional
violation, the court of appeals turned to the second step of the qualified
immunity analysis: whether the constitutional right asserted by the Lewises
was clearly established. Framing the asserted constitutional right as a
substantive due process right to life and personal security in the context of a
442 [Vol. 41
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ruling to the Supreme Court of the United States.
C. The Decision
The majority opinion in Lewis, authored by Justice David
Souter and joined by Justices William Rehnquist, Sandra Day
O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
Stephen Breyer, began by holding that absent an intent to
terminate a person's freedom of movement (i.e., to hit or
injure a person), police pursuits are to be analyzed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 However, the Court observed,
where an intent to hit or injure a person exists in the context
of a police chase, the case should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment."
Turning to the claim that the officer had violated Philip
Lewis's substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that in cases
involving conduct by the executive branch, "only the most
egregious official conduct can be said to be 'arbitrary in the
constitutional sense, '"" and that the Court had long defined
such constitutionally cognizable conduct as that which
"shocks the conscience."2" Having set the "shocks the
conscience" test as the minimum threshold of culpability in
all substantive due process cases, the Court held that police
pursuits will only shock the conscience when the pursuing
officers intend to injure an individual. 5 Mid-level culpability
standards such as deliberate indifference and reckless
disregard, the Court observed, are a closer call and may be
insufficient to trigger the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment in police pursuits." The Court found that police
high-speed police chase, the court of appeals reviewed Supreme Court decisions
and decisions from the Ninth Circuit and concluded that the asserted right was
clearly established and that Deputy Smith was therefore not entitled to
qualified immunity. See id. at 443. Observing that Deputy Smith's conduct
"could be deemed to be in reckless disregard of Lewis's life and personal
security," the Court remanded for a jury determination. Id. at 445.
21. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853-54 (1998).
22. See id. at 853.
23. Id. at 846 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
24. Id. (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)).
25. See id. at 849.
26. See id.
2001] 443
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officers in high-speed pursuits have little time to weigh
competing factors and must make hasty judgments under
great pressure. In such circumstances, the Court held that
recklessness is not enough to trigger the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Recklessness or deliberate
indifference could, however, violate an individual's
substantive due process rights "when actual deliberation is
practical,"28 and when officers have time to make "unhurried
judgments.2 9
Concurring only in the judgment of the Court, Justice
Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, argued
that the majority had erred in analyzing the Lewises'
substantive due process claim under the shocks the
conscience test. The Court, Justice Scalia pointed out, had
recently adopted a different substantive due process analysis
in a case challenging legislative action, Washington v.
Glucksberg. ° Justice Scalia contended that the Glucksberg
analysis, which recognizes only rights "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and traditions,"1 is the correct analysis for
all substantive due process cases, and that the Lewis
majority's reliance on the shocks the conscience test in cases
challenging executive conduct was misplaced. The shocks the
conscience standard, Justice Scalia argued, is extraordinarily
subjective and requires an inquiry for which judges are ill-
suited."2 Applying the Glucksberg analysis, Justice Scalia
concluded that there was no historical or textual basis for the
substantive due process right asserted by the Lewis family,
and that their case failed as a result.3
Joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice Anthony
Kennedy attempted to find a comfortable seat on the fence
between the majority opinion and Justice Scalia's
27. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.
28. Id. at 851.
29. Id. at 853.
30. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that a Washington state law banning
physician-assisted suicide did not violate the substantive due process
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment).
31. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 860 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 721).
32. See id. at 865 (Scalia, J., concurring).
33. See id. at 862-64 (Scalia, J., concurring).
444 [Vol. 41
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concurrence. Acknowledging that he "share [d] Justice
Scalia's concerns" about the shocks the conscience test,
3 4
Justice Kennedy observed that the majority opinion left
plenty of room for an inquiry into history, tradition, and
precedent, and thus had not strayed too far from Glucksberg.35
A close reading of the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis
reveals that despite the nominal unanimity of the decision
there are deep rifts on the Court over the proper approach to
the Fourteenth Amendment as it is applied to executive
action. Among the majority and the concurrences are no
fewer than four distinct analytical approaches to the problem
presented in Lewis. While the Lewis decision may have
provided something of a resolution of the conflict among the
circuits as to the issue of police pursuits, the Court went
further, attempting to establish a test for all substantive due
process cases arising out of executive action. The
ambitiousness of the Court's approach, combined with the
splintered character of the decision, left court observers and,
more importantly, lower courts guessing as to how to analyze
future substantive due process cases.
II. MAJORITY MISSTEPS
The Lewis majority opinion began its treatment of
substantive due process by framing the Due Process Clause
as a bulwark against arbitrary government action.36 The Due
Process Clause operates, according to the majority, both when
"the fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness,
or in the exercise of power without any reasonable
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental
objective."37 However, the majority observed, the analysis
applied has traditionally differed depending on whether the
complained of government action is legislative or executive in
nature.8
34. Id. at 858 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
35. See id. at 857-58 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
36. See id. at 845-46.
37. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845-46 (citations omitted).
38. See id. at 846 ("While due process protection in the substantive sense
limits what the government may do in both its legislative and its executive
capacities, criteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary differ depending on
4452001]
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Focusing on the executive analysis, the majority
proceeded to take the step the Court had avoided taking since
the inception of modern substantive due process: it
articulated the minimum level of executive conduct required
to demonstrate a violation of an individual's substantive
rights under the Due Process Clause. The majority noted
that "only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be
'arbitrary in the constitutional sense,"' 9 and that the Court
had long defined such constitutionally cognizable conduct as
that which "shocks the conscience.""0 Observing that the
Court had "repeatedly adhered" to the shocks the conscience
test in the substantive due process setting since Rochin v.
California,4  the majority gave a less-than-rousing
endorsement of the shocks the conscience test, acknowledging
the most common criticism of the concept-its vagueness-
and calling it "no calibrated yard stick."42 The best the
majority could muster to answer this criticism was that the
shocks the conscience test "points the way."'8
The majority went on to explain why shocks the
conscience is the appropriate threshold for establishing a
violation of substantive due process rights. A longstanding
concern of substantive due process critics has been that a low
threshold of culpability would transform the Due Process
Clause into a "font of tort law," an area of the law properly
reserved to the states.4 To avoid such a result, the majority
stated that negligence must be ruled out as the propei
standard under the Due Process Clause. 5 Instead,
[iut is . . .behavior at the other end of the culpability
whether it is legislation or a specific act of a governmental officer that is at
issue." (citations omitted)).
39. Id. (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 847 (citing Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957);
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 746 (1987)).
42. Id.
43. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
44. See id. at 848 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
45. See id. (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986)).
446 [Vol. 41
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spectrum that would most probably support a substantive
due process claim; conduct intended to injure in some way
unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of
official action most likely to rise to the conscience-
shocking level.46
Attempting to inject some flexibility into the shocks the
conscience test, the majority held out the possibility that
something less than intent to injure could shock the
conscience. The majority suggested that while negligence will
never suffice, conduct falling between intent and negligence
on the culpability spectrum "may be actionable under the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Referring to such middle-ground
cases as "closer calls," the Court suggested that deliberate
indifference, recklessness, and even gross negligence may rise
to a conscience-shocking level, depending on the context .
"Deliberate indifference that shocks in one environment may
not be so patently egregious in another, and our concern with
preserving the constitutional proportions of substantive due
process demands an exact analysis of circumstances before
any abuse of power is condemned as conscience shocking. '
The majority then compared two "circumstances" under
which the differing levels of culpability might be conscience-
shocking. Circuit courts considering substantive due process
claims arising out of pretrial custody, the Court observed,
have held that deliberate indifference is sufficient to violate
the Due Process Clause. In contrast, police pursuits only
implicate the Fourteenth Amendment when the officers
intend to injure. The difference, the majority stated, is
essentially time and pressure. Deliberate indifference is
"sensibly employed only when actual deliberation is practical,
and in the custodial situation of a prison, forethought about
an inmate's welfare is not only feasible but obligatory under a
regime that incapacitates a prisoner to exercise ordinary
responsibility for his own welfare."" On the other hand, the
46. Id. (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331).
47. Id. at 849-50 (citing City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463
U.S. 239 (1983); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)).
48. See id. at 849.
49. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850.
50. Id. at 851 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
2001]
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majority stated, police chases are analogous to prison riots in
that decisions involving a vast number of competing factors
are made hastily and under pressure. In such situations, a
higher standard must be used.
To recognize a substantive due process violation ... when
only mid-level fault has been shown would be to forget
that liability for deliberate indifference rests upon the
luxury... of having time to make unhurried judgments,
upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely
uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations.
When such extended opportunities to do better are teamed
with protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly
shocking.... Accordingly, we hold that high-speed chases
with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen
their legal plight do not give rise to liability under the
Fourteenth Amendment .... 51
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that
the Lewis family had failed to even state a claim for relief
under the Court's newly minted shocks the conscience test.2
The complaint alleged mere negligence, recklessness, gross
negligence, and conscious disregard." Nowhere in the
complaint did the Lewis family allege that Deputy Smith
intended to harm Philip Lewis or that Smith's behavior
shocked the conscience, and thus the complaint failed to state
a cognizable claim that Philip Lewis's substantive rights
under the Due Process Clause were violated. 4 Furthermorej
the majority concluded that the evidence evinced no
suggestion that Deputy Smith's conduct was intentional and
thereby shocked the conscience.5 Accordingly, the majority
reversed the Ninth Circuit and affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment.
A. The Eighth Amendment Analogy
The shocks the conscience test as it is set forth in Lewis
51. Id. at 853-54.
52. See id. at 854.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854.
56. See id. at 855.
448 [Vol. 41
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requires a three-tiered inquiry:
1. Did the actor/s have sufficient time to deliberate? If
yes, go to No. 2, if no, go to No. 3.
2. If the actor/s had time to deliberate, were they
deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs well-being? If yes,
liability, if no, no liability.
3. If there was no time to deliberate, did the actor/s
intend to injure the plaintiff? If yes, liability, if no, no
liability.
This complicated inquiry is not a novel one. Without
clearly acknowledging it, the Lewis majority borrowed the
entire inquiry from the Eighth Amendment context, with only
minor linguistic adjustments.
In two major decisions, the Supreme Court established a
dual approach to the wide range of prisoner cases that arise
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. In Estelle v. Gamble,57 the Court coined
the controlling phrase in the Eighth Amendment context,
construing the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment to proscribe "unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain."58 Applying this articulation to a
prisoner's complaint that a prison physician did not properly
treat an injury, the Court held that "deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."'59
Ten years later, in Whitley v. Albers,6° the Court
observed, "[T]he general requirement that an Eighth
Amendment claimant allege and prove the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain should also be applied with due
regard for differences in the kind of conduct against which an
Eighth Amendment objection is lodged."6 Believing that
deliberate indifference was too low a level of culpability to
apply in cases involving prison riots and other high-pressure,
57. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
58. Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
59. Id.
60. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
61. Id. at 320.
44920011
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fast-paced situations that arise behind bars, the Court
established a different inquiry for such cases under which the
Eighth Amendment is violated only if the conduct was
engaged in "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm."'
Lewis adopts in its entirety the Estelle-Whitley
distinction between hasty, high-pressure situations, and
circumstances where deliberation is possible. Where Estelle-
Whitley used the phrase "unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain" to capture the overall meaning of the Eighth
Amendment, the Lewis majority applied the "shocks the
conscience" test to articulate the substantive protections of
the Due Process Clause in the executive context. The Estelle-
Whitley inquiry uses the "maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of harm" characterization and the "deliberate
indifference" standard for the latter, while Lewis uses the
"conduct intended to injure" and "deliberate indifference"
formulations, respectively.
So what is the problem? The problem is that the
Fourteenth Amendment is different from the Eighth
Amendment. The amendments are geared toward different
contexts, recognize different rights, and are intended to
protect against different kinds of conduct. Conflating the two
of them makes little sense. The constitutional text upon
which substantive due process jurisprudence is based is
remarkably different from the Eighth Amendment's
language. On its face, the Eighth Amendment would appear
to offer less protection from government misconduct than the
Due Process Clause, prohibiting only cruel and unusual
punishment and the infliction of pain, as opposed to the
Fourteenth Amendment's proscription against arbitrary
government conduct. However, by cutting and pasting its
Eighth Amendment analysis into the Fourteenth Amendment
context in Lewis, the Supreme Court essentially held that the
Fourteenth Amendment provides no more protection from
government misconduct to people at large than convicted
criminals in the midst of a prison riot. Such a result is
difficult to defend.
62. Id. at 320-21 (citation omitted).
450 [Vol. 41
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B. Police Pursuits Are Removed from Fourteenth
Amendment Scrutiny
The second major problem with the majority opinion in
Lewis is that it prevents a fleeing suspect from ever asserting
a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. While the
majority in Lewis noted at the outset that it granted
certiorari "to resolve a conflict among the circuits over the
standard of culpability on the part of a law enforcement
officer for violating substantive due process in a pursuit
case,"6 3 its efforts to preserve a place for substantive due
process in police pursuit cases were completely nullified.
Under the plain terms of the majority opinion, a police
pursuit that results in an injury to a fleeing suspect can
virtually never be found to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. In other words, the majority effectively destroys
the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to police
pursuits.
The first part of the Lewis majority was devoted to
answering the question of whether police pursuits should be
analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Fourth
Amendment. The analysis was necessary to address the
problems created by the Court's 1989 decision in Graham v.
Connor,' in which the Court held that individuals could be
precluded from seeking the protections of substantive due
process where the violative conduct is covered by a more
particular amendment that applies to the conduct at issue."
In Graham, the plaintiff asserted both violations of his rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by police
officers who detained him on suspicion of robbing a
convenience store.66  The Court concluded that because
63. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 839 (1998).
64. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
65. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259
(1997)).
66. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388-90. The plaintiff in Graham was a diabetic
who, feeling the onset of an insulin reaction, asked a friend to drive him to a
store so he could purchase some orange juice to counteract the reaction. When
the plaintiff entered the store and saw the long line of people ahead of him, he
rushed out of the store and asked his friend to drive him to another friend's
house. A police officer had observed the plaintiff enter and exit the store
quickly and became suspicious. About a half mile down the road, the officer
20011
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Graham's claims involved a seizure and the alleged use of
excessive force, the claims were properly analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment, and not the Fourteenth Amendment."
In holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to
the conduct alleged in Graham, the Court reasoned that a
substantive due process violation could never be stated where
there is "an explicit textual source of constitutional protection
against [the alleged] conduct." 8 In other words, where any
other constitutional amendment is read to govern a particular
claim, that particular amendment, and not "the more
generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the
guide for analyzing these claims." 9
The Graham holding could, for instance, preclude the
violation of substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
arising out of a police search because such a claim would be
"covered" by the Fourth Amendment. Graham represents a
real threat to the continued viability of substantive due
process analysis.0 Read broadly, Graham could preclude a
large chunk of potential substantive due process claims that
merely brush up against other enumerated constitutional
rights.7 For example, Graham could prevent the operation of
the substantive protections of the Fourteenth Amendment in
any case involving police conduct due to the Fourth
Amendment, in prison cases due to the Eighth Amendment,
stopped the car in which plaintiff was a passenger and placed Graham in
handcuffs, ignored his pleas for something to treat his insulin reaction, and
threw him into a police car. While Graham was released soon thereafter when
it was discovered he had done nothing wrong, he suffered a broken foot, cuts on
his wrists, a bruised forehead, an injured shoulder, and damage to his hearing.
See id.
67. See id. at 394-95. The Graham Court considered the applicability of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the plaintiffs claims, despite the fact that he had
dropped his argument that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the officer's
conduct. See id. at 400 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 395.
69. Id.
70. See Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court's "Jot for Jot"
Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086, 1103 (1998)
("Graham may logically be read to foreclose any substantive due process
inquiry.., whenever one can point to a specific textual provision that arguably
covers the territory."); see also Mays v. City of E. St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1002
(7th Cir. 1997).
71. See Massaro, supra note 70, at 1103.
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in expression or religion-related cases due to the First
Amendment, and in criminally based civil suits due to the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
The Lewis majority circumvented Graham by reading it
narrowly.72 The Fourth Amendment's application to seizures,
the Court observed, is limited to "governmental termination
of freedom of movement through means intentionally
applied."3 The Court pointed to a hypothetical offered in
Brower v. County of Inyo,74 in which it observed that "no
Fourth Amendment seizure would take place where a
'pursuing police car sought to stop the suspect only by a show
of authority represented by flashing lights and continuing
pursuit,' but accidentally stopped the suspect by crashing into
him. That is exactly this case."75 Thus, the Court held that in
police pursuit cases, the Fourth Amendment applies (and the
operation of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
protection is precluded) where a police officer stops a fleeing
suspect by intentionally striking her. Since the Lewis family
conceded that the case did not involve an intentional act by
Deputy Smith, the Court held that the circumstances of the
case were not covered by the Fourth Amendment, and thus
the Fourteenth Amendment claim was not precluded under
Graham.
Cut to the conclusion of the Lewis majority's substantive
due process analysis in which the majority determined that
only police conduct that shocks the conscience suffices to
violate an individual's substantive rights under the Due
Process Clause. Clarifying what sort of conduct would shock
the conscience in the police pursuit setting, the majority
concluded "high-speed chases with no intent to harm
suspects... do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth
72. In holding that Graham did not operate to preclude altogether a
Fourteenth Amendment claim in Lewis, the Supreme Court overruled the
decision of the Seventh Circuit in Mays v. City of E. St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999 (7th
Cir. 1997), in which Judge Easterbrook held in a policy-laden opinion that
Graham required the application of the Fourth Amendment to a police chase
case. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-45 (1998).
73. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844 (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593,
597 (1989)) (emphasis added).
74. 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
75. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844 (quoting Brower, 489 U.S. at 597).
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Amendment."76 Thus, the Court held that in police pursuits,
the Fourteenth Amendment applies only if the police officer
intends to harm the fleeing suspect.77
The problem in Lewis now becomes clear: a substantive
due process violation may only be stated when a pursuing
police officer intends to harm the suspect, yet because of
Graham, the Fourth Amendment precludes a Fourteenth
Amendment claim when a police officer in pursuit intends to
strike a fleeing suspect. The only circumstances under which
a Fourteenth Amendment claim arising out of a police chase
might exist are the very circumstances under which a
Fourteenth Amendment claim is precluded by the Fourth
Amendment under Graham."8
Thus, despite the Lewis majority's apparent interest in
preserving substantive due process as recourse for injuries
arising out of a high-speed police chase, its analysis forecloses
such a possibility. To the extent that any successful
constitutional claim might arise out of a police pursuit, it will
arise under the Fourth Amendment, or not at all.
Does it make a difference whether a police pursuit case
involving intentional injury of a fleeing suspect is analyzed
under the Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendment? As a
general practical matter in civil claims under § 1983, no. The
Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the Court in Brower, or
the Fourteenth Amendment as analyzed by the majority in
Lewis applies and a constitutional violation will be found as
76. Id. at 854.
77. See id. at 855. What the Court meant by suggesting that Fourteenth
Amendment liability may lie where a police officer intended to "worsen [a
fugitive's] legal plight" is unclear. It is difficult to conceive of a police officer
chasing suspects solely or even largely for the purpose of somehow inspiring
them to commit criminal violations in addition to those for which they were
presumably suspected. Even if a police officer was found to have such intent, it
is even more difficult to conceive of a case in which police officers and their
employers would somehow be liable for a suspect's decision to, for example,
break a speed limit or run a red light after a police officer commenced pursuit.
Thus, I do not believe that the Court's reference to conduct intended to "worsen
a suspect's legal plight" offers a viable option for a Fourteenth Amendment
claim.
78. The distinction between "intent to strike" and "intent to harm" is
meaningless in high-speed police pursuit cases like Lewis. Intending to strike a
person with a car is tantamount to intending to injure her.
454 [Vol. 41
CONFUSING PURSUITS
long as the plaintiff proves that a police officer intentionally
used her vehicle to strike a fleeing individual.79 In fact, it
may be easier under the Fourth Amendment standard of
"reasonableness" for a plaintiff to establish a constitutional
violation." In addition, it might be that police chases
resulting in injuries to innocent bystanders, not suspects,
might be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment, as
police would most likely never intend to hit or injure
bystanders.81
On a deeper level, however, it matters a great deal
whether the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment applies. The
majority in Lewis purported to preserve a sphere of executive
action, however limited, to which the substantive component
of the Due Process Clause still applies and under which it
protects the substantive, not merely procedural, rights of
individuals. The fact that the Fourteenth Amendment may
never operate in the particular context in which the Court
attempted to preserve that sphere-police pursuits resulting
in injuries to fleeing suspects-severely undermines not only
the majority opinion and the Court's decision as a whole, but
also the future of substantive due process in the executive
setting.
C. Shortcomings of the Conscience-Shocking Standard
Another major difficulty with the Lewis decision is its use
of the shocks the conscience test. Shocks the conscience has a
troubled history, marked by a dubious birth, inconsistent
usage, harsh criticism, and lukewarm advocacy, even from its
proponents." Somehow, it has managed to maintain enough
79. However, in a criminal case in which evidence was found as a result of a
police officer intentionally hitting a fleeing suspect, the evidence might be
suppressed. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
80. Proving that an officer lacked probable cause or a reasonable basis to
seize a person or thing is a less onerous task than establishing that such
conduct shocks the conscience or was deliberately indifferent.
81. See Onossian v. Block, 175 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that Lewis
applies with equal force to injuries suffered by bystanders and fleeing suspects).
82. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1320 (3d Cir. 1994) ("From
the very day of its application in Rochin, the 'shocks the conscience' test, if it
can be called a test at all, has received harsh criticism from many jurists . . .");
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) ("While the Rochin test,
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vigor for the Supreme Court to embrace it as the cornerstone
of its analysis in executive action-related substantive due
process claims. Given the test's many shortcomings, however,
it is unclear why the Court did so in Lewis.
1. Silence on the Threshold
The use of the shocks the conscience test in Lewis was
surprising in light of prior cases in which the Supreme Court
was squarely presented with the same issue, yet was reticent
to set forth a minimum threshold of culpability for all
substantive due process cases. The companion cases Daniels
v. Williams83 and Davidson v. Cannon," which were handed
down on the same day, were the Court's first attempt at
directly confronting the question of the requisite state of mind
required to show a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantees in a § 1983 suit.85
In Daniels, the Court considered a prisoner's claim that
prison officials violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by
negligently leaving a pillow and newspapers on prison stairs
upon which the prisoner slipped and fell. The Daniels
majority reviewed the history of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and concluded that "it does not purport to supplant
traditional tort law"86 or act as "a font of tort law to be
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be
administered by the States."87  Therefore, the Court
concluded, governmental negligence is "not addressed by the
United States Constitution," and an assertion of negligence is
insufficient to state a claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment.88
'conduct that shocks the conscience,' is not one that can be applied by a
computer, at least it points the way.") (internal citation omitted).
83. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
84. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
85. The Court had dealt with the question in passing in Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527 (1981), where it held that the negligent loss of a prisoner's hobby
kit amounted to a Due Process Clause violation. See id. at 536-37. Daniels
overruled Parratt to the extent that it held that mere negligence could violate
an individual's Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331-32.
86. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332.
87. Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
88. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 336.
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The majority in Daniels expressly declined to state what
level of culpability would be sufficient to state a claim under
the Fourteenth Amendment.89  Addressing the plaintiff-
petitioner's argument that refusing to set negligence as the
standard would leave the courts guessing about whether
intent or something less than intent could violate the Due
Process Clause, the Court stated that drawing distinctions
among such levels of culpability would not be overly
burdensome to the lower courts and that "the difference
between one end of the spectrum-negligence-and the
other-intent--is abundantly clear.""
The Court relied on Daniels in deciding Davidson, which
involved a prisoner's claim that prison officials failed to
protect him from another inmate." The plaintiff had notified
prison officials in writing of a threat from another prisoner.
Prison officials received and considered the written
communication from the plaintiff, but decided the threat was
not serious.92 Soon thereafter, the plaintiff was attacked and
beaten by the prisoner who had made the threat.93 The Court
held that the plaintiff-petitioner had stated only a negligence
claim, which, according to Daniels, was insufficient to give
rise to a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.9
Dissenting in Davidson was Justice Blackmun, who,
joined by Justice Marshall in whole and Justice Brennan in
part, 5 wrote that negligence was not perhaps necessarily
insufficient to constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation
and that recklessness or deliberate indifference were
certainly sufficient to constitute such a violation. What
triggers the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Blackmun
89. See id. at 335 n.3 ("[T]his case affords us no occasion to consider
whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or 'gross
negligence,' is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.").
90. Id. at 335 (construing 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 3 (1923)).
91. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 345 (1986).
92. See id. at 348.
93. See id. at 345.
94. See id. at 347-48.
95. Justice Brennan declined to join Blackmun in his argument that
negligence could rise to the level of a constitutional tort, but did join Blackmun
in holding that recklessness or deliberate indifference could deprive a person of
her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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wrote, is deliberation; negligence and certainly recklessness
or deliberate indifference could involve a level of deliberation
or intent sufficient to give rise to a claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment.9" The acts of the prison officials in
Davidson, Justice Blackmun continued, "may well have risen
to the level of recklessness," and therefore, may have violated
the prisoner's rights under the Due Process Clause.97 This
was enough for the dissenters to find that Daniels, where the
prisoner had neither pled nor produced evidence of anything
more than negligence, did not control the outcome of
Davidson.
Thus, the majorities in Daniels and Davidson had held
that negligence was not enough to trigger the protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but expressly left open the
question of what was enough. Three justices had agreed that
recklessness or deliberate indifference would be sufficient to
violate a person's rights under the Due Process Clause. The
circuit courts then raced to fill the vacuum left by the
Supreme Court, staking out positions everywhere along the
culpability threshold, from gross negligence and reckless
disregard to deliberate indifference and intent.98 Daniels and
Davidson remained good law in the years leading up to Lewis,
and thus circuit courts were still guessing when Lewis came
down.99
96. See Davidson, 474 U.S. at 354 n.3 (arguing that negligence could involve
deliberation and that there was evidence that prison officials deliberated over
the threat against plaintiff and decided to ignore it); see also id. at 357 (stating
prison officials knew of the threat and yet "intentionally delayed" protecting the
prisoner).
97. See id. at 350 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98. Some courts required a showing of intent, including the First Circuit in
Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033 (1st Cir. 1996), and the Third Circuit in Fagan v.
City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994). Other circuits required merely
deliberate indifference, including the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 201 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1361 (1995),
the Ninth Circuit in L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1996), and the Tenth
Circuit in Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 571 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1118 (1996).
99. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court obliquely addressed the
threshold question of what level of conduct was required to violate substantive
due process in Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992), but it did so sub
silentio, without announcing that it was resolving the question expressly left
unanswered by those two cases.
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A review of Daniels and Davidson makes it clear that the
Court's precedent did not mandate the shocks the conscience
test. The shocks the conscience test had taken a serious
beating in the Court ever since its debut in Rochin v.
California.°° It had commanded a clear majority in the
Fourteenth Amendment setting only once, in Rochin, and was
quickly disavowed by the Supreme Court after that first use.
Whenever it has been applied, even its proponents appear to
hold their noses. Most significantly, shocks the conscience is
not a standard at all, but rather a vague overlay that offers
little practical guidance and ultimately ends up relying on
traditional standards of culpability. In light of the delinquent
background of the shocks the conscience test, the Court's
embrace of the test in Lewis is all the more baffling. At the
very least, it is clear that the Court was not required by
history or precedent to apply the shocks the conscience test in
Lewis.
Moreover, the Court's precedent favored a lesser
standard than shocks the conscience or intent. In Daniels
and Davidson, the Court merely held that negligence could
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, leaving open the
question of whether anything from gross negligence to intent
was sufficient to give rise to a substantive due process claim.
Three justices in Davidson held that reckless or deliberately
indifferent conduct could violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, in the cases preceding Lewis, the Court had, again and
again, stopped short of holding that only behavior that was
intentional or conscience-shocking could violate an
individual's substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.
2. A Troubled Past
The shocks the conscience standard was first applied in
the Fourteenth Amendment context in Rochin. In that case,
police officers entered the home of a man they believed was
selling drugs and forced their way into his bedroom, where
they observed the plaintiff, his wife, and two capsules on the
nightstand. When the officers asked the plaintiff who the
capsules belonged to, he snatched the capsules and swallowed
100. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
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them. After attempting to extract the pills themselves, the
officers took the plaintiff to a hospital, where they directed a
doctor to shove a tube into plaintiff's stomach against his will
and thereby cause the plaintiff to vomit. Two capsules
containing morphine were recovered, and plaintiff was
convicted of drug possession and sentenced to sixty days in
prison.
Writing for the majority in Rochin, Justice Frankfurter
offered a spirited endorsement of substantive due process and
an ode to the judiciary's role in protecting individual rights.
The Due Process Clause, Justice Frankfurter argued, protects
against government conduct that "'offends those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the
most heinous offenses,"""' and guarantees respect for "those
personal immunities which ... are 'so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people to be ranked as fundamental' or
are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""" Justice
Frankfurter argued at length, and somewhat defensively,
that despite its vagueness, the concept of substantive rights
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause has sufficient limits to
prevent it from becoming subject to the "merely personal and
private notions" of individual judges.' To the contrary, he
continued, the judiciary is well suited to identify the
substantive aspects of due process.'
The legitimacy of substantive due process established,
Justice Frankfurter turned to the conduct of the police
officers and concluded that "the proceedings by which this
conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating
crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the
101. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,
416-17 (1945)).
102. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
103. Id. at 172 ("The faculties of the Due Process clause may be indefinite
and vague, but the mode of their ascertainment is not self-willed.").
104. See id. at 171. Most of Frankfurter's decision is devoted to a defense of
the judiciary's role in ascertaining the nature of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. He relies particularly on the limitations inherent on the
judiciary-the judicial method, the tools of reason and tradition, the narrow
confines ofjudiciary power, etc.
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conscience.""°5  Referring to the Fifth Amendment's
protections against self incrimination and coerced
confessions, Justice Frankfurter held that it would be wildly
inconsistent "to hold that in order to convict a man the police
cannot extract by force what is in his mind, but can extract
what is in his stomach." 6 He concluded that the police
officers' conduct "offend[ed] 'a sense of justice' and, thus,
violated the Due Process Clause.0 7
Justice Frankfurter's newly minted shocks the conscience
standard was roundly criticized by Justices Black and
Douglas in their separate concurrences in Rochin. Justice
Black, writing that he preferred to consider the officers'
conduct a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against
compelled testimony, argued that the majority opinion "vests
this Court with . . .unlimited power to invalidate laws," a
view to which he could not subscribe."' Invoking the specter
of Lochner v. New York, °9 Justice Black contended that the
shocks the conscience standard threatened to subject state
action of every kind to constitutional scrutiny based on a
"reasonableness" standard and, despite the majority's
protests to the contrary, appeared to turn largely on the
personal notions of judges."0 Far from protecting individual
liberties, Justice Black claimed, the shocks the conscience
standard threatened them."' Justice Douglas echoed Justice
Black's sentiments, stating that the standard set forth by the
majority intruded on the state administration of justice and
was far too vague. The "decencies of civilized conduct"
standard, Justice Douglas observed, threatened to make state
rules of evidence "turn not on the Constitution, but on the
idiosyncrasies of the judges who sit here.""2
The Rochin shocks the conscience test was essentially
105. Id. at 172.
106. Id. at 173.
107. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173-74.
108. Id. at 176 (Black, J., concurring).
109. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
110. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 176-77.
111. See id. at 177 ("I long ago concluded that the accordion-like qualities of
this philosophy must inevitably imperil all the individual liberty safeguards
specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.").
112. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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rendered moot within two years, as seven justices in Irvine v.
California.." appeared to reject the test's reliance on the Due
Process Clause in favor of the direct application of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendment to circumstances like those in
Rochin."' Rochin's demise was solidified in 1961, when the
Court brought cases with facts similar to Rochin directly
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment and extended the
exclusionary rule to state court proceedings in Mapp v.
Ohio."' Justice Black and others continued to rail against the
shocks the conscience standard in subsequent cases."6
The shocks the conscience standard was rarely
mentioned after Rochin. It made cameo appearances in other
areas of constitutional jurisprudence, warranting mention in
a series of Eighth Amendment cases."1 7  However, the
majority never relied upon it in any Fourteenth Amendment
case for nearly three decades after Rochin."8 When it did
113. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
114. See id. at 133; id. at 138 (Clark, J., concurring); see also Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 664 (1961) (Black, J., concurring). The shocks the conscience test
also suffered a serious blow in Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), in
which the Court held that the taking of blood from a suspect in an automobile
accident to screen for intoxicants was held not to shock the conscience because
the blood was drawn "under the protective eye of a physician." The Court failed
to explain why the drawing of a suspect's blood in a physician's presence is any
less intrusive than the pumping of a suspect's stomach by a physician.
115. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
116. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 381 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting);
Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 392 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 n.4 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Braden v.
United States, 365 U.S. 431, 442 n.12 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
117. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (Eighth
Amendment "contemporary standards of decency" standard provides protection
similar to that of Fourteenth Amendment shocks the conscience standard);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (though not using the shocks the
conscience test by name, the court cites "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity, and decency" as instructive in deciding prison
condition cases under the Eighth Amendment); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 360 n.142 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing appellate cases holding
that punishment that shocks the conscience may violate the Eighth
Amendment).
118. The shocks the conscience test was invoked by a concurrence and a
dissent and roundly criticized by another dissent in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390 (1993), a case in which the court limited the habeas corpus appeals of a
prisoner. See id. at 420 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 428 (Scalia, J.,
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arise, it was usually accompanied by harsh criticism. 119
After a long period of dormancy, the shocks the
conscience test resurfaced in Collins v. City of Harker
Heights,"' a case brought by the widow of a city worker who
died of asphyxia after entering a manhole to unstop a sewer
line. Plaintiff claimed that the city had failed to train or
warn its sanitation employees about workplace hazards and
thereby, caused her husband's death and violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In a rather
brief analysis, the Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that
a municipality's "failure to train its employees, or to warn
them about known risks of harm, was an omission that can
properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience
shocking, in a constitutional sense."' The Court reasoned
that the Due Process Clause was not a substitute for
traditional tort law, and that only conduct that is "arbitrary
in the constitutional sense" may violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 ' The passing reference in Collins to
conscience-shocking behavior and its citation to Rochin was
the first time in four decades a majority had relied even
implicitly on the test in the Fourteenth Amendment setting.
Collins did not conclusively resolve the question of the
minimum threshold of culpability in substantive due process
concurring); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 377-78 (Black, J., dissenting). There
Justice Black stated:
I realize that it is far easier to substitute individual judges' ideas of
"fairness" for the fairness prescribed by the Constitution, but I shall
not at any time surrender my belief that that document itself should be
our guide, not our own concept of what is fair, decent, and right. That
this old "shock-the-conscience" test is what the Court is relying on,
rather than the words of the Constitution, is clearly enough revealed by
the reference of the majority to 'fair treatment' and to the statement by
the dissenting judges in the New York Court of Appeals that failure to
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt amounts to a "lack of
fundamental fairness." As I have said time and time again, I prefer to
put my faith in the words of the written Constitution itself rather than
to rely on the shifting, day-to-day standards of fairness of individual
judges.
Id.
120. 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
121. Id. at 128.
122. See id. at 128-29.
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cases. Circuit courts split on the meaning of Collins, some
circuits holding that the decision had established "shocks the
conscience" as the minimum substantive due process
threshold2. and others interpreting the Court's reliance on
the term "arbitrary" as suggestive of a threshold lower than
shocks the conscience.' 4 Some circuit judges suggested that
the Court in Collins used the word "arbitrary" to denote a
lower-culpability alternative to "conscience-shocking," and did
not establish shocks the conscience as the new, exclusive
standard for Fourteenth Amendment cases.' 5 The Court
relied more heavily on the word "arbitrary" in Collins than it
did "shocks the conscience," thus suggesting that "arbitrary"
conduct was the Court's new minimum threshold for the
Fourteenth Amendment.'26 Other judges opined that perhaps,
because the facts in Collins lacked the indicia of even tort
liability, the Court was establishing shocks the conscience as
an alternative standard to deliberate indifference or some
other heightened threshold.' 7 It was of this split that the
Supreme Court spoke when it decided Lewis. 8
123. See, e.g., Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 573-74 (10th Cir 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1118 (1996); Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1303-09
(3d Cir. 1994) (en banc).
124. See L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Dallas Ind.
Sch. Dist., 38 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 1994).
125. See Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1312 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
126. See Collins, 503 U.S. at 128-30. As previously discussed, the word
arbitrary lends itself to, at most, a deliberate indifference standard. Arbitrary
was used four times, shocks the conscience was used twice.
127. See Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
128. It should be noted that the shocks the conscience test has occasionally
found its way into the Eighth Amendment context, though in a more subtle
fashion. In a case exploring the meaning of the "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause of the Eighth Amendment, the Court took note of the view
that the Eighth Amendment's protections were superfluous in a democracy,
because "government by the people instituted by the Constitution would not
imitate the conduct of arbitrary monarchs. The abuse of power might, indeed,
be apprehended, but not that it would be manifested in provisions or practices
which would shock the sensibilities of men." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 375 (1910). This formulation of the meaning of cruel and unusual
punishment, however, did not catch on. The shocks the conscience test was
cited but not relied upon by the Court in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 363
(1981) (listing shocks the conscience as one among many articulations of the
analysis required by the Eighth Amendment; "the application of realistic yet
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In light of this troubled pedigree, it is surprising that the
Court chose to resuscitate the shocks the conscience test in
Lewis. The history of the test belies the Lewis majority's
observation that "for nearly half a century now we have
spoken of the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as
that which shocked the conscience."'29 To the contrary, the
test had virtually passed into constitutional oblivion since
Rochin and there appear to be good reasons that it did. 3° It is
difficult to come up with a reason why a test that had fallen
into such disrepute and suffers from so many shortcomings
could arise to form the basis of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence in as contentious an area as substantive due
process.
3. Vagueness and Imprecision
The most oft-voiced criticism of the shocks the conscience
test is that it is vague and imprecise. This criticism was
voiced even by the majority in Lewis, which, while endorsing
the shocks the conscience test, called it "no calibrated
yardstick," and that it merely "points the way." 3' Justice
Kennedy claimed that the shocks the conscience test should
be viewed with great suspicion.'32 Other courts have been less
charitable with the test. In a case that applied the shocks the
conscience test, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
called it "amorphous and imprecise.""' Likewise, the Fourth
humane standards to the conditions as observed").
In a decision holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to
alleged constitutional injuries inflicted in a post-trial incarceration context, the
Court observed, "It would indeed be surprising if, in the context of forceful
prison security measures, conduct that shocks the conscience or [affords]
brutality the cloak of law, and so violates the Fourteenth Amendment, were not
also punishment inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency and
repugnant to the conscience of mankind." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327
(1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Despite these brief cameos, the shocks the conscience test has not
caught on in the prison context any more than it had in the Fourteenth
Amendment context prior to Lewis.
129. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998).
130. See infra Part II.C.3-7.
131. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847.
132. See id. at 858 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308 (3d Cir. 1994).
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Circuit applied the shocks the conscience test only after
stating that it "remains an admittedly imprecise [test] in
formulation." 4 The Tenth Circuit noted that conscience-
shocking behavior "cannot precisely be defined, but must
necessarily evolve over time from judgments as to the
constitutionality of specific government conduct.""5 And
these are all cases that adopted and relied upon the shocks
the conscience test.
Shocks the conscience is merely a name given to a
Fourteenth Amendment concept that has taken on myriad
formulations. The Fourteenth Amendment has been said to
proscribe conduct that'36 "shock[s] itself into the protective
arms of the Constitution," 7 violates the "decencies of civilized
conduct," 8' or violates "some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental." 9 It rankles "those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
speaking peoples"4 ° and breaches "the community's sense of
fair play and decency,"" ' conflicts with "deeply rooted feelings
of the community,"42 infringes on "fundamental notions of
fairness and justice,"4 3 and robs individuals of "rights...
basic to our free society."44 It constitutes "an unreasonable,
unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the
individual to his personal liberty or to enter into...
contracts."15 It intrudes upon "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice,"46 constitutes an "arbitrary restraint
of... liberties,"'47 and a "denial of fundamental fairness,
134. Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732 (4th Cir. 1999).
135. Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995).
136. I owe this list to Justice Black, who catalogued them in his dissenting
opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 512 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting).
137. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring).
138. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
139. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
140. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945).
141. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173.
142. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 604 (1948).
143. Id. at 607.
144. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
145. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
146. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
147. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923).
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shocking to the universal sense of justice."'48 It is conduct
that is "intolerable and unjustifiable,""9 and which the Court
and society can "not tolerate."5 °
It is no wonder that this test is often criticized for
vagueness. Not only have a wide range of characterizations
been applied, but those characterizations themselves often
have taken a more general and vague form than the shocks
the conscience test they intended to clarify.
In light of the proliferation of articulations, one would
think that the Court has at some point attempted to define
the shocks the conscience test. It has not. Characterizations
such as those cited above and references to common law
levels of culpability are all lower courts have to go on in their
efforts to ascertain the outer boundaries of what shocks the
conscience.
4. Subject to Subjectivity
Soon after the shocks the conscience test was first
applied, one Supreme Court Justice wrote that the test:
makes for such uncertainty and unpredictability that it
would be impossible to foretell-other than by
guesswork-just how brazen the invasion of the intimate
privacies of one's home must be in order to shock itself
into the protective arms of the Constitution. In truth, the
practical result of this ad hoc approach is simply that
when five Justices are sufficiently revolted by local police
action a conviction is overturned and a guilty man may go
free.' 5'
This leads to the second criticism of the shocks the
conscience test, that it is subject to subjectivity. Justice
Scalia lampooned the test in his Lewis concurrence by quoting
from a Cole Porter tune to illustrate his view that there is no
judicial analysis more dependent on the individual
predilections of judges than the shocks the conscience test:
"[Tioday's [majority] opinion resuscitates the ne plus ultra,
the Napoleon Brandy, the Mahatma Ghandi, the Celophane
148. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
149. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
150. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 631 (1965).
151. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring).
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of subjectivity, th' ol' 'shocks the conscience' test."'52 Justice
Scalia argued that he would prefer to decide the case not on
the basis of whether the conduct at issue "shock[s] my still,
soft voice within.""3 In ridiculing the shocks the conscience
test, Justice Scalia built on Justice Black's oft-stated,
subjectivity-based criticism of the test.
The subjectivity of the shocks the conscience test stems
from the fact that shocks the conscience is not a true
standard of conduct at all. Shocks the conscience, as it
originally was conceived, does not describe a level of
culpability that turns on the actor's state of mind, such as
intent or negligence. Rather, the shocks the conscience
concept turns on the personal reaction of another to particular
conduct, that is, whether the conduct shocks the conscience of
others. Thus, the primary focus in the shocks the conscience
test is not on the person whose conduct is at issue, but on the
person who perceives that conduct and her reaction to it. And
this is what makes the shocks the conscience analysis such a
sticky inquiry.
- 5
152. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S 833, 861 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia's footnote to the quotation read, "For those
unfamiliar with classical music, I note that the exemplars of excellence in the
text are borrowed from Cole Porter's 'You're the Top,' copyright 1934." Id. at
861 n.1. Justice Scalia neglected to defend his characterization of this show
tune as "classical" against those fans of Mozart and Bach who might take
exception. Nor did he include a number of the more interesting "exemplars of
excellence" contained in the Porter tune, such as a "Bendel bonnet," a
"Shakespeare sonnet," the "Tow'r of Pisa," the "Mona Lisa," the "National
Gall'ry," "Garbo's Sal'ry," "a baby grand of a lady and gent," "Pepsodent," a "Ritz
hot toddy," a "Brewster's body," a "dance in Bali," a "hot tamale," or my favorite
couplet of all, a "Drumstick Lipstick" and "da foist in da Irish Svipstick." Still
more surprising was Justice Scalia's restraint in not using the line in the song
that might have aptly characterized his belief that the majority opinion was "a
toy balloon that is fated soon to pop."
153. Id. at 865.
154. Compounding the difficulty of applying the shocks the conscience test is
the distinction between conduct and harm. The test is intended to focus on
whether the conduct of the state actor shocked the conscience. However, it
becomes difficult if not impossible to prevent the extent of the harm from
influencing the conclusion as to whether the conduct shocked the conscience. A
judge is more likely to find that the particular conduct of an individual shocked
the conscience where the injury is serious. Conduct, even that which in and of
itself seems marginally blameworthy, is more likely to be found conscience
shocking when it renders the victim a quadriplegic. If the police officer in Lewis
CONFUSING PURSUITS
By using a test that refers to the innermost sanctum of
the human mind where individuals grapple with clashing
norms and make deeply personal decisions, the Court has
created a standard that is determined by standards as
numerous as there are individuals. True, throughout history
many have argued that in the human conscience lies a
universal understanding of right and wrong, a standard
compass with which all human beings are equipped to
navigate the troubled waters of good and evil. But also
throughout history, the human conscience has caused
individuals to resist "universal" norms and to turn against
the prevailing mores, often with heroic virtue. Even further,
the conscience of individuals and societies has failed on
numerous occasions to prevent grotesque and unspeakable
acts of human cruelty. The human conscience, then, is at best
a mystery and serves as a virtually unknowable, and
therefore inappropriate, foundation for a legal inquiry.
Furthermore, the shocks the conscience test necessarily
raises the question of whose conduct is being shocked. Is it
the judge's conscience? The jury's? The victim's? Society's? A
reasonable, prudent person's? Each possible "shockee"
presents serious challenges because they either undermine
the universality of the test (if the test varies from judge to
judge, or jury to jury, it provides no reliable standard at all)
or render the test unknowable (how does one assess whether
conduct shocks society's conscience?). Remarkably, this
question has never been answered directly by the Supreme
Court. Some have concluded that the shocks the conscience
test requires that the judge's conscience be shocked,'
had intended to hit the motorcyclist, but only caused scrapes and bruises, such
facts would inevitably cause a judge to lean against a conscience shocking
finding, even when the necessary intent was present. The difficulty of
separating conduct and harms makes an already confusing inquiry even more
subjective.
155. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 865 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("For judges to overrule that democratically adopted policy
judgment on the ground that it shocks their consciences is not judicial review
but judicial governance."); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 428 (1993) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("If the system that has been in place for 200 years (and remains
widely approved) 'shock[s]' the dissenters' consciences .... perhaps they should
doubt the calibration of their consciences, or, better still, the usefulness of
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however, this is rarely clearly articulated. The test is set
forth in neutral terms referring only to "the conscience,"
rather than "a judge's conscience." Perhaps this is because it
seems inappropriate to establish a constitutional test that on
its face turns on the consciences of judges, rather than on
interpretations of law or elucidations of fact.
Assuming that the judge is the "shockee," the test
appears to call upon judges to do that which is wholly
inconsistent with the role of a jurist, to use their own deeply
held and personal views to resolve a legal question.
Certainly, such views creep into judicial decision making all
the time, but judges are commanded by their role as fact
finders and legal arbiters to fight that tendency. The shocks
the conscience test thus corrupts the role of a judge by
expressly incorporating a judge's own conscience into a
constitutional analysis.
5. Reliance on Traditional Standards of Culpability
It is perhaps because of the subjectivity of the shocks the
conscience test that the majority in Lewis went to such great
lengths to tie the test to less subjective moorings. The
majority's efforts in this regard, however, created new and
different problems.
In an effort to tame the amorphous nature of the shocks
the conscience test, the Lewis majority linked it to tort-based
culpability standards such as intent and negligence. In
Lewis, the Court explained on the one hand that "[iut should
not be surprising that the constitutional concept of
conscience-shocking duplicates no traditional category of
common-law fault,"'56 but the Court then proceeded to fall
back on common law concepts in identifying what would
shock the conscience on facts similar to those presented in
Lewis. The majority held that in a high-speed police chase
only an "intent to harm suspects physically" would be
'conscience shocking' as a legal test."); Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf
and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1238 (10th Cir. 1999) ("plaintiff-appellant's claim
must be predicated on reckless or intentionally injury-causing state action
which shocks the conscience of federal judges") (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
156. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848.
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conscience-shocking; that is, where there was time to
deliberate, deliberate indifference (or reckless disregard) to
the safety and well being of the plaintiff would shock the
conscience.'7
Using tort culpability concepts to manage the meaning of
the shocks the conscience test makes little sense because
shocks the conscience, at least as it was originally conceived,
is not a test of an individual's state of mind. This argument
was advanced before Lewis by Judge Anderson of the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, who concurred in part and
dissented in part in Williams v. City and County of Denver.'
Judge Anderson criticized the majority's effort to tie the
shocks the conscience test to the state of mind of the
government actor. The shocks the conscience test, Judge
Anderson argued, was a test intended to evaluate the conduct
of a government actor.9 The state of mind of the government
actor, Judge Anderson argued, is relevant only to determine
responsibility for a constitutional violation, but "it is simply
irrelevant when the issue is whether the government conduct
is so arbitrary as to be conscience shocking."
°60
Judge Anderson's criticism of the majority in Williams
could easily apply to the majority in Lewis. By establishing
an analysis that uses shocks the conscience as a mere proxy
for tort-based state-of-mind concepts, the Lewis majority tore
the shocks the conscience test from its roots as a standard
focused on the nature of the conduct at issue and tied it to the
state of mind of the actor. In Rochin, it was the act of
government agents forcibly pumping a person's stomach for
evidence to use against him that shocked the conscience and
not the mental state of the officers who oversaw it. In fact,
the mental state of the officers in Rochin probably would not
have risen to the level of a constitutional violation under the
Lewis analysis as the officers were simply attempting to
extract evidence they believed to be in the stomach of the
plaintiff. Apparently, they had no intention of injuring the
157. See id. at 848-54.
158. 99 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 1996). After Lewis was decided, Williams was
vacated and remanded to the district court for consideration in light of Lewis.
159. See id. at 1021.
160. Id. at 1022.
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plaintiff or of being deliberately indifferent to his needs.
The Lewis majority had a laudable goal. Seeking to
combat the vagueness and subjectivity of the shocks the
conscience test, the majority harnessed it to the more
objective benchmarks of intent and deliberate indifference.
However, in doing so, the majority may have completely
ignored the meaning of shocks the conscience. The shocks the
conscience test, by its language and as it was historically
conceived, calls for a judgment on the conduct itself; it does
not call for a judgment on the state of mind of the
perpetrator. A charitable reading of Lewis would be that the
majority was attempting to fundamentally alter the shocks
the conscience test sub silentio. However, the majority's
reliance on precedent and its failure to acknowledge the very
different approach it was taking on the shocks the conscience
test undermines its decision to use this controversial test.
The Court's analysis involves four leaps. First, the Court
invokes the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause. Second, the Court states that the Due Process Clause
protects against arbitrary action. Third, the Court holds that
arbitrary action is conduct that shocks the conscience.
Fourth, the Court concludes that conduct that shocks the
conscience is conduct committed by an actor with intent to
injure in some circumstances and deliberate indifference in
others. It seems a torturous road to travel only to arrive at a
fairly simple test. Lewis exposes the shocks the conscience
test as not a test of culpability, but a judicial overlay, and not
a particularly helpful one at that. The test is parasitic,
returning ultimately to common law concepts of culpability,
ranging from reasonable behavior and negligence to
recklessness and intent. The shocks the conscience test does
not bring clarity to the level of conduct required to violate the
Due Process Clause. The Court has been forced to graft on
common law concepts in order to provide it with substance.
Why the Court went to such lengths to preserve such a
vacuous standard is a mystery.
6. Matters of Context and Timing
The Lewis majority wrote that conduct that "shocks in
one environment may not be so patently egregious in
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another"161 and suggested that lesser levels of fault along the
spectrum of culpability, such as deliberate indifference, might
rise to a conscience-shocking level depending on the
circumstances.' In particular, the Court held that conduct
involving split-second decision-making and high pressure
only shocks the conscience when it involves an intent to
injure, and conduct that was the result of "unhurried
judgments" might shock the conscience if it was merely
deliberately indifferent.
6 3
Thus, the shocks the conscience test set forth by the
majority in Lewis involves more than merely pointing to the
extreme end of the spectrum of culpability, it involves an
assessment of the context in which the conduct took place,
including the amount of time the actor had to reflect on his or
her actions. Even here, however, the test runs into problems.
How much time must elapse before the move from "intent to
injure" to "deliberate indifference" is made? Lower courts
have begun struggling with this question already. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently decided that a social
worker acting to separate a parent and child "will rarely have
the luxury of proceeding in a deliberate fashion" even when
that process may take a number of days. It applied the
"purpose to harm" analysis to the facts concluding that a
social worker had not intended to injure the child or its
parents.' On the other hand, a district court recently
161. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850.
162. See id. at 854.
163. See id. at 852. The majority referenced the Court's holding in Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), an Eighth Amendment case in which the Court
declined to apply the deliberate indifference standard to official conduct during
a prison riot, arguing that "a deliberate indifference standard does not
adequately capture the importance of such competing obligations, or convey the
appropriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in
haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance."
Id. at 320. The Court instead required conduct that was used "maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Id. at 320-21 (quoting
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. John
v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
164. See Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 370-73, 375-76 (3d Cir.
1999) (despite the fact that the process of investigating and removing the
children from custody took place over multiple days and included a physical
examination and hearing, the court of appeals held that the social worker was
acting under pressure similar to a police chase).
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suggested that a police chase might have lasted long enough
for the pursuing officers to have an opportunity to deliberate,
thus subjecting them to a "deliberate indifference" test rather
than the stricter intent to injure test.'65 Thus, the Lewis
majority's "time to deliberate" caveat creates new dilemmas
for courts as they attempt to navigate the waters of
substantive due process after Lewis.
Moreover, it is not clear why the constitutional standard
of culpability should change with the amount of time the
actor has to reflect. A middle-ground level of fault, such as
deliberate indifference or reckless disregard, is capable of
accounting for the circumstances the actor faces, including
the time the actor has to reflect, the pressure or stress of the
situation, and any other factors that might mitigate in the
actor's favor. Thus, the conduct of a police officer who has
ample time to contemplate whether to use force to subdue a
suspect might be found deliberately indifferent, whereas a
police officer subject to exigency and pressure might not be
found deliberately indifferent, despite the fact that both made
identical decisions. Requiring a showing of intent in the
latter police officer's conduct simply because she didn't have
as much time to think as the former officer ignores the fact
that the time to deliberate is already incorporated into a mid-
level fault analysis such as deliberate indifference. Under a
deliberate indifference approach, the analysis would take into
account the pressure under which an officer was acting but
would not hold the under-pressure officer to a vastly different
or more forgiving standard merely because the officer had to
think and act quickly. Officers are trained and paid to make
such decisions in difficult situations and should not be held
less accountable in exigent circumstances.
The consequence of Lewis is that a whole spectrum of
conduct is essentially constitutionally immunized whenever a
state actor is under some sort of pressure. As noted, there is
some evidence that courts are willing to apply the Lewis
majority's time-to-deliberate test liberally, holding that even
bureaucratic government officials with days to act are under
sufficient time pressure to warrant the application of the
165. See Feist v. Simonson, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1146 (D. Minn. 1999).
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higher, intent-level threshold.'66  Thus, the apparently
innocuous distinction the Court drew between hasty and
deliberative decisions may cut a wide swathe, denying
liability for a wide range of reckless and deliberately
indifferent government conduct.
7. Shockingly Strict
Another criticism of the shocks the conscience test is that
it is simply too strict a test. As noted above, the test requires
a finding that the conduct is beyond the bounds of all human
decency and antithetical to the idea of organized society.
67
Under the shocks the conscience test, only the most extreme
and egregious conduct will be sufficient to trigger the
protections of the Due Process Clause. The test thus permits
an immense array of injurious conduct to take place outside
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In practice, courts have rarely found that the conduct of
state actors shocks the conscience. The Supreme Court has
found conduct to be conscience-shocking in the Fourteenth
Amendment sense only once, in Rochin, more than three
decades ago. The circuit courts have been just as tight-fisted
in their willingness to find that conduct shocks the
conscience. Circuit courts have found that executive conduct
shocked the conscience only in the most extreme of
circumstances where a police officer raped a woman after
pulling her over for a broken tail light,'68 and where an
individual was detained for fifty-seven days before his trial
without a hearing.'69 A requirement that a police officer
undergo a penile plethysmograph as a condition of
reinstatement 7 also shocked the conscience of a circuit court.
On the other hand, judges on the First Circuit were not
shocked by police officers' threats to kill a criminal suspect's
wife and statements to the suspect's children that they would
never see their father again if he was caught,17' nor were they
166. See Miller, 174 F.3d at 375-76.
167. See supra Part II.C.3.
168. See Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1998).
169. See Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 1998).
170. See Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1992).
171. See Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1991).
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shocked by a campaign of police intimidation intended to
dissuade a property owner from evicting a police officer living
at a house without the owner's permission, including threats,
insults, and pushing the property owner's pregnant
daughter.172
Particularly in police-chase cases, the shocks the
conscience bar is particularly high. To establish conscience-
shocking conduct on the part of an officer in pursuit, an
individual must show that a police officer actually intended to
strike and injure a person. As the Third Circuit put it,
"where a police officer uses a police vehicle to terrorize a
civilian, and he has done so with malicious abuse of official
power shocking the conscience, a court may conclude that the
officers have crossed the constitutional line."7 ' Absent proof
of such extreme conduct, no constitutional violation will be
found.
By limiting the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment to conduct that "shocks the conscience," the
Supreme Court has constitutionally immunized a broad
swathe of wrongful conduct by executive actors. The shocks
the conscience test is the Fourteenth Amendment's version of
the "rational basis" test, under which nearly every instance of
government conduct, short of rape or months of unjustified
incarceration, will be found not to violate the Due Process
Clause. The wholesale removal of such a large chunk of
executive conduct from the protection of the Constitution
should have given the Court greater pause.
III. SCALA'S SCATHING "DISSENT"
A. Justice Scalia's Approach
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the
judgment of the Court but authored an acerbic opinion that
ransacked the majority's analysis. Justice Scalia's argument
struck at the very root of the majority opinion by questioning
one of the majority's fundamental premises: that the analysis
172. See Cruz-Erazo v. Rivera-Montanez, 212 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2000).
173. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1986)).
476 [Vol. 41
CONFUSING PURSUITS
of substantive due process claims based on executive conduct
is different from the analysis of such claims in the legislative
context.
Justice Scalia essentially made a case for a unified theory
of substantive due process by arguing that all substantive due
process cases, those involving both legislative and executive
conduct, should follow the analysis set forth in 1996 by the
majority in Washington v. Glucksberg.'74 In Glucksberg,
another "unanimous" yet extraordinarily divided decision, the
Court was faced with a substantive due process challenge to a
Washington state statute that criminalized assisted suicide.175
There, the majority endorsed a substantive due process
analysis that has two major elements. First, the Glucksberg
majority required a "careful description" of the asserted
substantive due process right.7 ' What this means for Justice
Scalia is that the asserted right is identified at the lowest
level of generality possible.'77  Second, the Glucksberg
majority required a determination of whether the asserted
right, narrowly defined, is "'deeply rooted in [our] Nation's
history and tradition.""78 The Glucksberg analysis thus
involves an examination of statutes and laws, past official or
governmental practices and their prevalence, and legal
history to determine whether an activity has been historically
protected.
The proper analysis to apply in Lewis, argued Justice
Scalia, was the Glucksberg analysis, which asks "whether our
174. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
175. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060(1) (1994); see also 1854 Wash. Laws
78, 17 (stating every person deliberately assisting another in the commission of
self-murder, shall be guilty of manslaughter).
176. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
177. For example, consider the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), a substantive due process challenge to a Georgia anti-sodomy
law. There, the majority defined the right narrowly, as the right to engage in
sodomy. The right could easily have been articulated at a much higher level, as
the right to conduct oneself as one chooses in the privacy of one's own home, or
the right to privacy in deeply personal areas such as sex and marriage, both of
which the Court has determined to be areas of privacy protected by the
Constitution. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
178. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
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Nation has traditionally protected the right respondents
assert.'79 Defining the right at issue in Lewis as the right to
be free from "deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a
high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a
suspected offender," Justice Scalia conducted a perfunctory
review of Supreme Court cases and concluded that there was
no support for the proposition that mid-level culpability is
insufficient to trigger due process protections, particularly in
police pursuit cases.8 ° Holding otherwise would "transform
every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional
violation." 8'
Justice Scalia accused the Lewis majority of attempting
to circumvent the Glucksberg analysis by taking an approach
similar to the one advocated by Justice Souter but rejected by
the majority in Glucksberg. In a concurring opinion in
Glucksberg, Justice Souter had offered an alternative
substantive due process analysis that grew out of the phrase
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."8 ' Instead of
looking to particular laws or practices, Justice Souter argued
in Glucksberg that the Court's substantive due process
analysis should be guided by principles deduced from broad
constitutional provisions, language in prior decisions, and
historical context.' Justice Souter named "liberty,"'84
"privacy,"8 ' and "personal autonomy"186 as principles that had,
in the past, been relied upon to trigger substantive due
process review.11
7
179. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 862 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
180. See id.
181. Id. at 864 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989)).
182. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
183. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 764 (Souter, J., concurring).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 770.
186. Id. at 777.
187. The Court often incorporates into its principle analysis historic and
modern trends and current attitudes on an issue. Harlan's dissent in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961), paid particularly close attention to the extent
to which current practices in society had broken with traditions. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
implicitly recognized the recent liberalization of sexual attitudes. Planned
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According to Justice Scalia, Justice Souter's majority in
Lewis resembled Justice Souter's discarded concurring
opinion in Glucksberg in that it represented a "throwback to
highly subjective substantive due process methodologies."'
Like Justice Souter's principle-based approach to substantive
due process in Glucksberg, Justice Scalia argued, the shocks
the conscience test itself results in arbitrary action by courts
because it offers nothing but an amorphous standard that
turns on the particular sensitivities of individual judges.
Justice Scalia concluded, "I would reverse . .. not on the
ground that petitioners have failed to shock my still soft voice
within, but on the ground that respondents offer no textual or
historical support for their alleged due process right."'
B. The Shortcomings of Scalia's Approach: Combining
Legislative and Executive Action
Justice Scalia's approach does not solve the shortcomings
of the majority opinion in Lewis and, in fact, creates a new set
of problems. Justice Scalia's criticisms of the shocks the
conscience test were accurate but incomplete, and his novel
effort to unify the substantive due process analysis for cases
involving legislative and executive action is not only
unsupported by precedent, it also has grave consequences in
the executive setting that could decimate the application of
the substantive aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
conduct of executive officials. 9°
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), clearly paid heed
to current attitudes and trends on the issue of abortion.
188. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
189. Id. at 865 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190. The Glucksberg majority's analysis, combining a narrow definition of
asserted rights with the historical approach, has an extraordinary limiting
effect on new substantive due process claims. Writing for the majority in
Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that substantive due process
protects only those rights that are deeply rooted in our nation's history and
traditions. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710. Surveying the laws of the 50
states, as well as philosophical and cultural records, Rehnquist concluded that
physician-assisted suicide had no roots in tradition and history, and therefore
could not be considered a right protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 728.
Three other Justices joined Rehnquist's majority without comment. In order to
establish a new substantive due process right under the Glucksberg analysis,
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There are serious problems with Justice Scalia's
argument. First, a review of precedent reveals that the
there would have to be evidence that the right, narrowly defined, has received
protection throughout the nation's history-that is, there would have to have
been laws on the books in at least a majority of the states protecting the conduct
at issue, widespread government policies or practices allowing or protecting the
activity, or other historical evidence, on a national scale, of society's acceptance
or endorsement of the conduct. Put simply, the Glucksberg majority makes the
recognition of new substantive due process rights virtually impossible - it is
highly unlikely that a newly asserted right, narrowly defined, will survive the
rigid historical inquiry that seems to require nothing short of longstanding laws
in most states that protect the particular conduct at issue. Thus, the
Glucksberg majority's analysis presents a nearly insurmountable hurdle to new
substantive due process rights.
However, Glucksberg's 9-0 vote was not nearly as clear as Scalia implies.
In truth, Glucksberg was, like Lewis, a deeply divided decision with an unclear
outcome. The hard blow to substantive due process inflicted by the majority in
Glucksberg was softened by Justice O'Connor, who, in providing a necessary
fifth vote for the majority opinion, noted that she voted with the majority only
because the statute at issue did not infringe on the use of pain medication and
"palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths." Id. at 738
(O'Connor, J., concurring). She did not believe the Court needed to reach the
issue of "whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great
suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the
circumstances of his or her imminent death." Id. at 736. O'Connor all but
stated that, were the circumstances of the case different, she would find a right
to physician-assisted suicide. Such a right, however, would be antithetical to
Rehnquist's historical exegesis, which found no such right. Providing the fifth
vote to the slight Glucksberg majority favoring the tradition approach, O'Connor
casts doubt on whether Rehnquist's tradition approach would indeed command
a majority in subsequent substantive due process cases and suggests that the
analysis set forth in the majority opinion in Glucksberg may have all the force of
a plurality opinion.
Furthermore, there is an inherent flaw in the Glucksberg majority's
logic. The majority looks to history and tradition to ascertain whether a right
has received sufficient protection in the law and society to consider it "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 721. In other words, to decide whether
a right should be protected, the Court looks to whether it has been historically
protected. Thus, under the Glucksberg majority, the Due Process Clause
protects only those that are already protected. The Glucksberg majority
relegates substantive due process to an unnecessary, irrelevant back-up role,
and renders it virtually inoperable. In light of the tenuousness of support on
the Court for the Glucksberg majority's tradition approach to substantive due
process, Justice Scalia's heavy reliance on it may have been a bit over-
enthusiastic.
Interestingly, the author of the Glucksberg majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, did not sign on to Justice Scalia's concurrence in Lewis, and instead
joined Justice Souter's majority opinion, severely undermining Justice Scalia's
contention that the majority had adopted an approach rejected in Glucksberg
and Justice Scalia's efforts to import Glucksberg into the Lewis analysis.
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shocks the conscience test, and other tort-based tests such as
deliberate indifference, have only been applied by the Court
in executive action cases. Justice Scalia pointed to no cases
in which the shocks the conscience test was applied in a
legislative action case. In support of his argument that the
shocks the conscience test has never been limited to executive
action, Justice Scalia observed that "in fact, 'shocks-the-
conscience' was recited in at least one opinion involving
legislative action," United States v. Salerno.' Justice Scalia's
reliance on Salerno was mistaken. First, the Court did not
apply the shocks the conscience test in Salerno, it merely
mentioned it in a general discussion of the Fourteenth
Amendment's protections: "This Court has held that the Due
Process Clause protects individuals against two types of
government action. So-called 'substantive due process'
prevents the government from engaging in conduct that
'shocks the conscience,' or interferes with rights 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.""9
This was the only reference to the shocks the conscience
test in Salerno. The case itself involved legislative conduct in
which two criminal defendants argued that the Bail Reform
Act's authorization of pretrial detention on the basis of
dangerousness to the community violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 3 The Salerno majority applied a version of
intermediate scrutiny and held that the government had a
compelling interest in preventing persons who pose a danger
to the community from being released, and that the Act was
narrowly tailored to further that interest.9 Thus, the only
case Justice Scalia could find to support his argument that
the shocks the conscience test had been applied to legislative
action did no such thing.
In fact, Salerno undermines Justice Scalia's argument
because the majority in Salerno drew the very distinction he
resists. The Salerno majority separated the protections of the
Due Process Clause into two categories: (1) against
191. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
192. Id. at 746.
193. See id. at 741.
194. See id. at 751.
2001]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
government conduct that shocks the conscience, and (2)
against the interference with rights implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. This is precisely the dichotomy the majority
drew in Lewis. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, argued that
there is only one possible category of substantive due process
cases, the latter.
The Lewis majority adopted sub silentio the distinction
drawn in Salerno holding that, consistent with precedent, the
shocks the conscience test applies to executive action, and the
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" test applies to
legislative matters. The problem with the Lewis majority is
that it failed to explain and justify this distinction
adequately. In order to soundly defeat Justice Scalia's
criticism, the majority needed to offer a compelling
explanation as to why executive action required a substantive
due process analysis different from that applied in legislative
action. But what should have been a bang was a whimper
because the majority's explanation consisted of one sentence
buried in a footnote: "Executive action challenges raise a
particular need to preserve the constitutional proportions of
constitutional claims, lest the Constitution be demoted to
what we have called a font of tort law."9 5 It was not an
explanation, but a tautology, carrying with it about as much
meaning as Justice Marshall's oft quoted non sequitur in
McCulloch v. Maryland'96 that "it is a constitution we are
expounding."'97 The explanation begs the very question it
seeks to answer.
The Lewis majority had plenty of compelling reasons for
an analytical distinction between substantive due process in
the executive and legislative settings. First, the Lewis
majority had precedent on its side. While Justice Scalia
argued that there is no case holding that the shocks the
conscience test applies only to executive action, he did not
address the fact that the shocks the conscience test originated
in a quintessential executive action case involving the use of
police force (Rochin), and that all the cases in which the
195. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8.
196. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
197. Id. at 407.
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shocks the conscience test was invoked by the Court involved
only executive action.'98 Thus, Justice Scalia's invocation of
precedent to support his unified theory of substantive due
process backfired; the prior cases, even those Justice Scalia
cited, stack up against his contention.
Second, the Lewis majority may have refrained from
explaining why the shocks the conscience test applies to
executive action challenges because the proposition is so
obvious. According to the Court in Lewis, shocks the
conscience is a culpability-based standard that turns on the
state of mind of the actor. In certain circumstances, intent to
injure will shock the conscience and in others, deliberate
indifference will suffice. Such a standard is inappropriate to
apply to legislative action because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to ascribe traditional levels of culpability to a
legislature. Shocks the conscience requires a type of
"legislative intent" that is nearly impossible to determine. It
would make little or no sense to ask whether a particular law
was passed with intent to injure or with deliberate
indifference to a person's constitutional rights.
This leads us to the most important problem with Scalia's
argument. The shocks the conscience test and the Glucksberg
analyses each come at the Fourteenth Amendment from
different directions. Where Glucksberg seeks to identify
discrete substantive rights embedded in history and tradition,
the shocks the conscience test straddles the line between
protecting procedural and substantive rights by asking
whether executive conduct was carried out in such an
egregious manner as to offend a fundamental sense of justice.
Thus, it could be argued that the shocks the conscience test is
more consistent with the Due Process Clause because it
simply protects against executive action of any kind that
takes place in a manner that is completely inconsistent with
notions of due process, that is, arbitrary, malicious, and
offensive executive action. Put another way, the right
protected under the shocks the conscience test is the right not
to be subjected to government conduct that shocks the
198. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 352 U.S. 165 (1952); Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
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conscience. It does not protect some other discrete and
specific right that we must search through dusty historical
volumes to unearth.
The reason that distinct approaches are warranted is
that legislative and executive action is inherently different.
Executive action is less deliberate than legislative action.
Executive action involves a different kind of decision-making
that is often highly individualized and particularized, in
contrast to legislative consensus building and generality.
Executive action is often a one-shot affair not involving the
lasting sort of burden on one's constitutional rights that a
statute does. And executive officials, unlike legislators,
require some level of deference in order to effectively perform
their functions.'99  Thus, executive action demands an
analysis that is different from legislative action. It demands
an analysis that accounts for the distinctive nature of
executive action by providing straightforward yet deferential
guidance to executive officials who, for the most part, have
neither the time nor the resources to consult those dusty
historical volumes to ascertain whether a particular right is
deeply rooted in our nation's history. The shocks the
conscience test apparently was intended to provide the kind
of analysis most appropriate for executive action. It is, at
root, a gut-level test that provides some deferential guidance
to executive officials short of requiring that officials and
agencies know and understand whether particular rights are
deeply rooted in the nation's history and traditions.'0° As
199. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
200. This takes us back to the legislative-executive distinction. Procedural
due process violations arise almost exclusively out of executive actions; actions
by executive officers taken without notice or without providing a citizen an
opportunity to be heard. Legislative actions rarely give rise to procedural due
process violations because the legislative process is by its very nature a
procedure. Legislation, rather, most often impinges on substantive rights, and
therefore the challenges to legislation are not based on the procedure by which
they are passed, but the effect a law has on a person's constitutional rights. The
inherent differences between legislative and executive action, are reflected in
the substantive due process analysis. As discussed above, substantive due
process in the executive setting has a procedural bent to it, because executive
action inherently involves less process than legislative action. Thus, action by
an executive officer often shocks the conscience because it is arbitrary, not
484 [Vol. 41
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noted supra, the shocks the conscience test has serious
shortcomings, but it is far more appropriate in the executive
context than the Glucksberg history and tradition analysis.
Justice Scalia's approach in Lewis has the attractive
quality of reducing the substantive due process inquiry into
one central analysis that applies in all cases. However, the
major problems with the approach are that it is inappropriate
in light of the substantial differences between legislative and
executive action and unsupported in case law.
C. The Majority's Rejoinder to Scalia: The Footnote
In a lengthy footnote, the Lewis majority confronted
Justice Scalia's argument that the shocks the conscience test
is inappropriate, and that Glucksberg's history/tradition
analysis is the alpha and omega for all substantive due
process cases.
The Lewis majority distinguished Glucksberg on the basis
that Lewis involved a due process challenge to executive
action, while Glucksberg addressed a substantive due process
violation arising out of legislative conduct.2"' Executive
action, the majority wrote, "presents an issue antecedent to"
the history/tradition question addressed in Glucksberg.2"'
[E]xecutive action challenges raise a particular need to
preserve the constitutional proportions of constitutional
claims, lest the Constitution be demoted to what we have
called a font of tort law. Thus, in a due process challenge
to executive action, the threshold question is whether the
behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the
contemporary conscience. That judgment may be
informed by a history of liberty protection, but it
necessarily reflects an understanding of traditional
executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the
because it impinges on a substantive right. Because of the lack of procedure
inherent in most executive action, as compared to legislative action, the
substantive due process analysis in the executive realm focuses on the
procedural deficiencies that have a substantive impact (i.e., egregious conduct),
whereas in legislative action, the procedure inherent in the legislative process
focuses the inquiry on only the substantive impact of the law.
201. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998).
202. Id.
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standards of blame generally applied to them. Only if the
necessary conditions of egregious behavior were satisfied
would there be a possibility of recognizing a substantive
due process right to be free of such executive action, and
only then might there be a debate about the sufficiency of
historical examples of enforcement of the right claimed, or
its recognition in other ways. In none of our prior cases
have we considered the necessity for such examples, and
no such question is raised in this case.2O'
The meaning of this footnote is a mystery. On one
extreme, it could be argued that the footnote constitutes a
nearly complete capitulation to the reasoning of Justice
Scalia's concurrence. The footnote appears to relegate the
shocks the conscience test to a mere "antecedent" and
"threshold" test and to concede to Justice Scalia's argument
that the root inquiry in all substantive due process cases is
whether the asserted right is rooted in the nation's legal
history and traditions. Thus interpreted, the footnote makes
the majority's approach to substantive due process cases
involving executive action even more restrictive than Justice
Scalia's approach in that plaintiffs must not only show that
the state actor's conduct shocked the conscience, but also that
the right asserted by the plaintiff is rooted in the nation's
history and traditions. This poses a nearly insurmountable
hurdle for plaintiffs asserting substantive Fourteenth
Amendment violations by executive actors, particularly in the
realm of high-speed police chases.
On the other hand, the footnote could be interpreted in
the context of the majority opinion as a whole, which treats
the shocks the conscience test as the sum and substance of
the analysis required under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nowhere in the text or in any other footnote is there a
reference to an additional inquiry beyond the shocks the
conscience test. This suggests that the observation was not
essential to the holding, and therefore was dicta. Moreover,
the conditional language of the footnote-that shocks the
conscience "may" be informed by history and tradition; there
"might" be a debate about history and tradition after the
203. Id.
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shocks the conscience test was satisfied-suggests that
Justice Souter was not conceding Justice Scalia's point.
Perhaps the footnote was meant to secure a majority for
Justice Souter's opinion.
Regardless of what the majority intended to say with this
footnote, it lends the opinion to an interpretation that could
render the shocks the conscience test essentially moot. By
characterizing shocks the conscience as a "threshold" test and
possibly conceding Justice Scalia's point that the Glucksberg
analysis governs all substantive due process cases, the
footnote makes it possible for a lower court to bypass the
shocks the conscience test altogether by assuming the answer
to the threshold question of whether the conduct shocks the
conscience and proceeding directly to the history and
tradition inquiry set forth in Glucksberg. Lower courts often
take such an approach in qualified immunity cases, assuming
that a constitutional violation has occurred and proceeding
directly to the question of whether the right was clearly
established such that a reasonable person in the defendant's
shoes should have known the right would be violated by his or
her actions." 4 Thus, footnote eight, particularly when coupled
with Justice Kennedy's concurrence," 5 creates a way for lower
courts to do an end run around the shocks the conscience
analysis set forth by the majority and apply the approach
endorsed by Justice Scalia.
At any rate, the footnote muddies the waters of the
opinion significantly. It could be argued that the footnote, by
failing to defend the shocks the conscience test as the alpha
and omega of the analysis in substantive due process cases,
created an opening for Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which,
as discussed below, compounded the confusion in Lewis.
IV. KENNEDY'S CONFUSING CONCURRENCE
While five other justices joined Justice Souter's majority
204. This assume-the-constitutional-violation approach is precisely the
approach Justice Stevens recommends in his concurrence in Lewis as a way of
avoiding the underlying constitutional adjudication in Lewis altogether. See id.
at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring).
205. See infra Part IV.
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opinion, three of them wrote concurring opinions that
articulated their reasons for joining the majority."°6 The most
troublesome of these was Justice Kennedy's. Joined by
Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy attempted to find a
comfortable seat on the fence between the majority opinion
and Justice Scalia's concurrence. However, in trying to span
the chasm between the majority and Justice Scalia, Justice
Kennedy's opinion attempted too much and succeeded only in
bringing even more confusion to an already divided decision.
Justice Kennedy began with a rousing defense of
substantive due process jurisprudence, pronouncing, "It can
no longer be controverted that due process has a substantive
component."2"7 Justice Kennedy also found that the facts in
Lewis clearly implicated the Fourteenth Amendment, as the
state was a causal agent in the taking of a life.
"The Court decides this case," Justice Kennedy wrote, "by
applying the 'shocks the conscience' test first recognized in
Rochin v. California."8 The phrase has the unfortunate
connotation of a standard laden with subjective assessments.
In that respect it must be viewed with considerable
skepticism."2 9 However, despite the weaknesses of the shocks
the conscience test, Justice Kennedy observed that it "can be
used to mark the beginning point in asking whether or not
the objective character of certain conduct is consistent with
our traditions, precedents, and historical understanding of
206. Rehnquist's concurrence was the most harmless of the bunch, simply
agreeing with the majority's choice of shocks the conscience as the proper
standard to be applied in substantive due process cases. Justice Stevens, who
did not join in the majority's opinion, argued that the Court should avoid
difficult constitutional questions when presented with a qualified immunity
defense, and instead assume that a constitutional violation has been stated and
proceed to the qualified immunity analysis of whether the asserted right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Justice Breyer concurred
in the majority opinion, but agreed with Stevens that lower courts should be
afforded the choice of avoiding "difficult or poorly presented" constitutional
questions by proceeding directly to a qualified immunity analysis.
207. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 856 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 708 (1997); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992);
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)).
208. 342 U.S. 162 (1952).
209. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the Constitution and its meaning. " 21 Justice Kennedy went
on to note that history and tradition, too, are only starting
points in most substantive due process cases, and that
substantive due process inquiries must also take into account
"objective" elements, such as the majority's "intent to injure"
requirement, which ensures that the analysis includes
consideration of the necessities of law enforcement.
Justice Kennedy's opinion is problematic from a
substantive standpoint because it attempts to strike a middle
ground between a majority opinion and a concurrence that
are simply too far apart. The majority and Justice Scalia
endorse divergent analyses, one that assesses state actors'
conduct on a spectrum of intent and culpability and another
that measures state actors' conduct against legal history and
tradition. Justice Kennedy strains to meld the two analyses
but ultimately ends up complicating them and, consequently,
confusing the courts below.
While Justice Kennedy signed on to the majority's shock
the conscience standard, he demonstrates clear sympathies
for Justice Scalia's historical approach, because the latter
provides the objectivity Justice Kennedy found lacking in the
majority opinion. 1' In fact, Justice Kennedy's opinion
appears to be more closely aligned with Justice Scalia's than
the majority. Unlike the majority, which, for the most part,
saw the shocks the conscience test as the sum of the analysis
of substantive due process claims in the executive context,
Justice Kennedy considered shocks the conscience to merely
"mark the beginning point in asking whether or not the
objective character of certain conduct is consistent with our
traditions, precedents, and historical understanding of the
Constitution and its meaning."
2 1
210. Id.
211. Justice Kennedy's affinity for Justice Scalia's approach is obvious, as he
continued, "As Justice Scalia is correct to point out, we so interpreted the test in
Glucksberg. In the instant case, the authorities cited by Justice Scalia are
persuasive, indicating that we would contradict our traditions were we to
sustain the claims of the respondents." Id. at 858. He also wrote, "I share
Justice Scalia's concerns about using the phrase 'shocks the conscience' in a
manner suggesting that it is a self-defining test." Id.
212. Id. This contrasts with footnote eight of the majority opinion, which
focuses almost exclusively on the shocks the conscience test and barely
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Thus, Justice Kennedy attempts to marry the majority
opinion and Justice Scalia's concurrence in the judgment into
one overarching analysis by relegating the shocks the
conscience analysis to a minimal threshold test and treating
Justice Scalia's history and tradition approach as the meat of
the inquiry. In doing so, Justice Kennedy holds would-be
plaintiffs to a more exacting burden than Justice Scalia or the
majority because, under Justice Kennedy's approach, a
plaintiff asserting a violation of a substantive due process
right by an executive actor would not only have to establish
that the complained-of conduct shocks the conscience but also
would have to clear the additional and even more daunting
hurdle of proving that statutes and judicial decisions have
historically frowned upon such conduct.
Justice Kennedy's approach would not be nearly so
problematic if it was simply the individual musings of a
member of the majority on his interpretation of the Court's
holding. But Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion holds
votes crucial to the majority, and thus it must be taken
seriously. Five other justices joined Justice Souter's majority
opinion. However, Justice Kennedy's concurrence reflects the
views of two of the majority's six signees: his and Justice
O'Connor's. Because Justice Kennedy's opinion constitutes a
"swing" concurrence, lower courts may view it as
persuasive.218 Furthermore, because Justice Kennedy's
"middle-ground" concurrence pays homage to Justice Scalia's
concurrence in the judgment and adopts an approach that is
closer in substance to Justice Scalia's than it is to the
majority's, Justice Scalia's concurrence also may be viewed as
persuasive by the lower courts. Justice Kennedy's opinion
thus transforms Justice Scalia's "dissent" from the Court's
reasoning into a competing analysis and consequently,
severely undermines the authority of the majority opinion.21
mentions the Glucksberg test.
213. See generally Igor Kirman, Standing Apart to Be a Part, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 2083 (Dec. 1995).
214. See id.
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V. LET CONFUSION REIGN
The difficulty posed by Lewis is that it leaves lower
courts guessing as to the proper analysis to apply in
substantive due process claims arising out of executive action.
Lower courts may effectively choose among the majority,
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, or Justice Scalia's
concurrence, in deciding whether a due process violation has
occurred.
The confusion among the Lewis opinions is no idle
concern. At least one circuit has explicitly adopted Justice
Kennedy's concurrence as the proper approach to substantive
due process claims against executive officials. In Armstrong
v. Squadrito,"1 ' the Seventh Circuit considered the case of a
plaintiff who had voluntarily turned himself in to authorities
pursuant to a warrant that had been issued when he failed to
appear in court for a hearing related to his child support
payments. Due to clerical errors and sheriffs department
procedures, the plaintiff was locked up for fifty-seven days,
despite the fact that he should have been held no longer than
one day. Plaintiff filed a § 1983 claim, asserting a violation of
his substantive rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause.
In framing its analysis, the Seventh Circuit panel turned
to Lewis, which had been handed down just a few months
earlier. The panel described Lewis as a "vigorous debate over
how to determine whether substantive due process confers a
particular right."16 First, the panel described Justice Scalia's
"dissent,"1' then the majority opinion, and finally Justice
Kennedy's concurrence. The court waffled, approving of
Justice Scalia's historical approach while deferring to the
majority's shock the conscience test. The court stated,
"[gliven the divergence on this issue, we will attempt to strike
a middle ground by following Justice Kennedy's schema.""8
Further, the Armstrong panel got the Justice Kennedy
215. 152 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 1998) (the panel was comprised of judges
Cummings, Bauer, and Evans).
216. Id. at 571.
217. See id. (In an ironically accurate slip, the panel mislabeled Scalia's
concurrence in the judgment as a dissent).
218. Id.
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analysis wrong. The panel conducted the analysis backward;
it did not begin its analysis with the shocks the conscience
analysis, as mandated by Justice Kennedy, but instead
examined "precedent, long-standing state and federal
statutes, and specific textual rights"19 in an effort to
determine whether there was a due process right "protecting
against prolonged confinement.""
Relying on the analysis applied in a 1985 case with
similar facts,' the circuit court panel concluded that the
right asserted by the plaintiff was historically based. The
court then proceeded to apply the "shocks the conscience" test
and concluded that the proper level of culpability under the
shocks the conscience test was "deliberate indifference."2
22
The panel concluded that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to the plaintiffs rights, and that the indifference
shocked the conscience. 3
219. Id. at 570. The Armstrong panel claimed to be adhering to Justice
Kennedy's opinion. In doing so, the panel stated:
[We will organize our thoughts as follows: First, we examine whether
the Due Process Clause protects against an extended detention,
without an appearance before a magistrate, following an arrest
pursuant to a valid bodily attachment. Second, we will explore
whether the defendants' conduct offended the standards of substantive
due process. And third, we will consider whether the totality of the
circumstances shocks the conscience.
Id.
However, Justice Kennedy's inquiry proceeds in precisely the opposite
manner. The shocks the conscience test is, according to Justice Kennedy, the
"beginning point." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). After a decision is made as to whether particular
conduct shocks the conscience, then the court moves to an inquiry into the
historical nature of the asserted right. See id.
220. Id. at 571.
221. See Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1985). In Coleman, the
plaintiff asserted a substantive due process violation arising out of his detention
pursuant to a criminal arrest warrant. The Coleman court conducted an
historical analysis of the right protecting against prolonged confinement and
found it to be sufficiently historically rooted to be of constitutional stature.
222. Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 576.
223. The Armstrong panel held that the particular conduct that violated the
plaintiffs rights in Armstrong was the jail's "will call system," under which the
jail would take no action once a prisoner was incarcerated unless it heard from
the court. See id. at 579. Thus, a prisoner whose court file was lost or
misplaced could be incarcerated indefinitely, and the jail had no policy of
reviewing prisoners' status to ensure that a prisoner was not detained too long.
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The problems presented by Justice Kennedy's
concurrence were realized in Armstrong. The panel
(reasonably, in my opinion) came to the conclusion that the
majority opinion was not worthy of complete deference in
light of Justice Kennedy's concurrence. Also, bolstered by
Justice Scalia's strong concurrence in the judgment, the panel
attempted to meld the approaches of the majority and Justice
Scalia, just as Justice Kennedy suggested, with disastrous
results. Furthermore, the panel appeared to be confused by
the very schema it sought to be guided by, as it applied
Justice Kennedy's analysis in reverse, thus exacerbating the
already confusing status of Lewis.
A second problem with the confusion in Lewis is that
courts are tempted to ignore Lewis altogether. The Seventh
Circuit panel virtually ignored the Lewis majority in a later
case, Khan v. Gallitano.'24  While the facts of Khan are
somewhat confusing,225 the conduct at issue was that of
officials in a municipality who allegedly used coercive tactics
while negotiating the condemnation of a particular piece of
property. Despite the fact that the substantive due process
violation asserted in that case unquestionably involved an
executive act, to which Lewis by its very terms applied, the
Khan panel inexplicably applied the historical inquiry set
forth in Glucksberg, calling it the "prevailing view." Almost
as an afterthought, the panel noted, "Although the Court in
Lewis used a substantially different analysis than it had in
Glucksberg, this does not mean that the Glucksberg analysis
See id. at 578.
224. 180 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1999) (sitting on the panel were judges Bauer,
Manion, and Rovner).
225. Khan was a suit brought by an attorney who sued city officials for
settling a case out from under her. The controversy swirled around the refusal
of a mall owner to release a tenant, Jewell Food Stores, from a lease or allow it
to sublet. Jewell sued the owner, but lost in court, and the mall owner then
turned around and sued Jewell. City officials stepped in and initiated
proceedings to condemn the mall in order to force the mall owner to drop his
suit against Jewell. After negotiations with city officials, the mall owner agreed
to drop the suit against Jewell. Khan, the plaintiff, was the mall owner's
attorney in the suit against Jewell, and was not apprised of the negotiations
that led the mall owner to drop the suit. Khan alleged that city officials coerced
her client, the mall owner, to dismiss the action she had filed on the mall
owner's behalf. See id. at 830-33.
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does not apply here."26 The panel reasoned that Lewis did
not apply to the facts at issue in Khan because Lewis involved
"a high speed chase where government officials had to make
split-second decisions."2 7 Thus, Lewis "has no resemblance to
the situation in this case."228 The panel went on to limit Lewis
to its facts, holding "that the Glucksberg fundamental rights
analysis generally applies in substantive due process cases,
but for the particular circumstances such as the high-speed
chase in Lewis or pre-trial detention, the specialized analysis
adopted for those circumstances would apply."2 2 9
Khan's treatment of Lewis is inexplicable. There is
absolutely nothing in the Lewis majority or in any other
opinion written by any other justice in Lewis that limits it to
the particular facts of high-speed police chases.2 ' To the
contrary, Lewis explicitly sets forth the analysis for non-police
chase cases involving executive action. Lewis was not merely
a case about the proper analysis to apply to police chases, it
was a case that sought to define the proper analysis for all
substantive due process claims arising out of executive action.
Khan was a substantive due process claim arising out of
executive action, and thus, the Seventh Circuit should have
adhered to the Lewis analysis and applied the shocks the
conscience test. The only thing shocking about the Seventh
Circuit's analysis in Khan was its utter disregard for the
holding in Lewis.
Moreover, to the extent that the Khan panel tried to
apply Lewis, it did so incorrectly. Having already concluded
under the Glucksberg analysis that no substantive due
226. Id. at 836.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. To the contrary, there are numerous cases extending Lewis beyond the
scope of police pursuits. See, e.g., Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't,
159 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1989) (police officer shooting bystander in gunfight);
Schaefer v. Goch, 153 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 1998) (police officer shooting bystander
in stand-off with suspect); Medeiros v. O'Connell, 150 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 1998)(bystander shot by police officer pursuing suspect who had commandeered a
school van); Radecki v. Barela, 146 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1998)
(bystander shot when officer requested his intervention in struggle with
suspect).
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process violation had occurred, the panel stated that "we
would reach the same conclusion whether we ask if the
defendants' conduct shocks our conscience or if the
defendants violated a fundamental right deeply rooted in our
tradition and history."231 A cursory review of the allegations
led the panel to conclude that the defendants' conduct did not
shock the conscience. The Khan approach, however, ignored
the Lewis majority's holding that a lower level of culpability,
"deliberate indifference," is the proper standard when the
defendants have time to deliberate, as was certainly the case
in Khan. The panel, however, made no mention of deliberate
indifference and appeared to apply the shocks the conscience
test oblivious to the guidance supplied by the majority in
Lewis.
The most plausible reason for the Seventh Circuit's
holding in Khan is that the panel, emboldened by the
opinions of Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia, chose to
ignore the Lewis majority altogether. Justice Scalia, and, to a
lesser extent, Justice Kennedy, adopted the analysis set forth
in Glucksberg as the core of all substantive due process
inquiries, and the Khan panel, therefore, may have decided
that Glucksberg offered a way to circumvent Lewis altogether.
The Fourth Circuit grappled with Lewis in Hawkins v.
Freeman.232 The plaintiff in Hawkins was a convicted felon
serving out a fifty-year sentence and was prematurely
paroled by mistake and then reincarcerated when the blunder
was discovered twenty months later. The plaintiff brought a
habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that his
reincarceration violated his substantive rights under the Due
Process Clause. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit held
that the reincarceration constituted a substantive due process
violation. After a hearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the panel and held that no substantive due process
231. Khan, 180 F.3d at 836. This observation by the Khan court reveals a
failure to closely read the Lewis decision, because it implies that the Supreme
Court in Lewis presented a choice between the shocks the conscience test and
the Glucksberg history and tradition analysis. As discussed above, the fairest
reading of the Lewis decision is that shocks the conscience is a threshold test to
the Glucksberg analysis; the two are sequential, not mutually exclusive.
232. 195 F.3d 732 (4th Cir. 1999).
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violation had taken place.
In approaching the question of whether the executive act
of revoking the plaintiffs parole and returning him to prison
constituted a violation of his substantive due process rights,
the Fourth Circuit appeared to use footnote eight of the Lewis
majority opinion to justify the application of Justice
Kennedy's analysis. Identifying the shocks the conscience
test as a "threshold question," the court described the
controversy among the majority, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Kennedy, and noted that Justice Kennedy appeared to see the
shocks the conscience test as a beginning point to the kind of
historical inquiry demanded by Justice Scalia and
Glucksberg.23 Noting that the Lewis majority "seemed not to
require this," the Fourth Circuit nonetheless concluded that
"courts seeking faithfully to apply the Lewis methodology in
executive act cases properly may look to history for whatever
it may reveal about traditional executive practices and
judicial responses in comparable situations by way of
establishing context for assessing the conduct at issue.""4
The Fourth Circuit bolstered this conclusion by seizing on the
reference in footnote eight of the Lewis majority to help
understand "traditional executive behavior" in assessing
whether particular conduct shocks the conscience. 35
Thus, under the Fourth Circuit's understanding of Lewis,
the shocks the conscience test is immediately transformed
into an investigation of history and tradition just as Justice
Scalia argued in his concurrence. While the Fourth Circuit
ultimately found that history and traditional practice were
unhelpful in determining whether the state conduct shocked
the conscience, the analysis appears to invoke history and
tradition to a far greater degree than what was contemplated
by the majority in Lewis. Footnote eight and Justice
Kennedy's concurrence appear to have been major factors in
the Fourth Circuit's misapplication of Lewis.
The Fifth Circuit, too, relied heavily on footnote eight in
holding that the substantive due process analysis set forth in
233. See id. at 738 n.1.
234. Id. at 739.
235. See id. at 742.
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Lewis requires a two-step analysis: (1) a determination of
whether the conduct shocked the conscience, and (2) "whether
there exists historical examples of recognition of the claimed
liberty protection at some appropriate level of specificity.""
There are indications from other circuits that the
opinions of Justices Kennedy and Scalia are influencing
decisions in substantive due process cases. Thus,
Armstrong, Khan, and Hawkins may be just the beginning of
the circuit courts' understandably divergent interpretations
and applications of Lewis.
VI. A DELIBERATE SOLUTION
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, lower courts
confront a serious challenge in attempting to solve the riddle
of Lewis. Even more difficult, however, is the process of
attempting to unravel the legal tangle Lewis has created. A
few observations might point the way.
First, the shocks the conscience test in Lewis was a
disaster. Regardless of whether the Court used the test as it
was originally conceived, as a measure of the nature of the
conduct at issue, or whether it piggybacks on traditional
common law concepts of culpability as it did in Lewis, the test
is confusing and misleading and abandoning it would greatly
alleviate the problems of substantive due process.
Second, there must be more clarity as to the relationship
between Lewis and Glucksberg. Is the shocks the conscience
test an essentially superfluous threshold inquiry, or is it
something more? Is Justice Scalia correct in arguing that the
Glucksberg history and tradition analysis is the root of all
substantive due process inquiries? Does a plaintiff who
overcomes the hurdle of proving that executive conduct
shocked the conscience then also have to prove that the
236. Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 668 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that
"a teacher's fabrication of sexual abuse against a student's father shocks the
contemporary conscience.").
237. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1999)
(using Justice Kennedy's concurrence to characterize the holding of the
Supreme Court in Lewis; focusing in particular upon the shocks the conscience
test as the beginning point of an inquiry into whether certain conduct is
consistent with the history and tradition of American society).
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conduct has been proscribed by laws or norms throughout
American history? By leaving these questions unanswered in
Lewis the Court only caused more problems for itself down
the line.
Finally, there must be another standard to replace the
shocks the conscience test. One could argue that that
standard is the deliberate indifference standard, which is a
clear measure of culpability with a far more reliable
constitutional pedigree than shocks the conscience. The
Supreme Court could have avoided the problems of Lewis by
simply adopting the strict test of deliberate indifference for
all substantive due process cases involving executive conduct.
Instead, the Court relegated deliberate indifference to a sub-
part of the shocks the conscience test and restricted its
application to circumstances where deliberation would be
possible. A close look at the deliberate indifference test
reveals that it would have better served the Court's purposes
in Lewis had it been applied across the board to all cases
involving executive action.
A. The Test of Indifference
Deliberate indifference is a high level of culpability, the
highest short of actual intent. Deliberate indifference
requires a showing of (1) a serious risk of harm; (2)
defendant's actual knowledge of (or, perhaps, willful
blindness to) that elevated risk; and (3) defendant's failure to
address that known, serious risk. 8 In this incarnation, 39
deliberate indifference is a formidably demanding standard,
requiring plaintiffs to prove a state actor's actual knowledge
of a serious risk and indifference to that risk in order to
prevail. In that formulation, deliberate indifference had
served with distinction in the Eighth Amendment context. It
has offered far more clarity and simplicity than the shocks
the conscience test. Despite all these advantages, the Lewis
Court inexplicably abandoned the deliberate indifference test
in favor of the confusing shocks the conscience test.
238. See Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 956 (1st Cir. 1992).
239. As discussed later, there are two basic versions of deliberate
indifference: objective and subjective.
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Intended to occupy the large and unpredictable terrain
between negligence and intent, deliberate indifference has
been applied by courts in the Fourteenth Amendment arena
and in other contexts without the severe controversy
generated by the shocks the conscience test. Most
importantly, deliberate indifference provides a minimum
threshold of culpability that is more consonant with the
Court's approach to substantive due process than shocks the
conscience.
B. The Background
Deliberate indifference made its constitutional debut
before the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble,4° where the
Court considered the complaint of a prisoner who claimed
that prison doctors and officials had violated his rights under
the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide adequate
medical care. The court held that the prisoner had not
adequately stated his claim because he had alleged mere
negligence and accident. To survive Eighth Amendment
scrutiny, the Court held that a complaint "must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs."241
The Estelle majority did not elaborate on what
constituted deliberate indifference, but one thing was clear:
deliberate indifference was intended to capture a level of
culpability that was greater than negligence, but less than
intent.4 ' In the years after Estelle, circuit courts grappled
with the precise definition of deliberate indifference. The
courts seemed to split between two different approaches to
defining deliberate indifference. The first and most popular
approach equated deliberate indifference with the common
law tort concept of reckless disregard, under which a person
is reckless if she believes, or reasonably should believe, that
her conduct is very likely to result in harm.42 The defining
240. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
241. Id. at 106.
242. See id.
243. This was the approach of the Eleventh, Tenth, and First Circuits. See
Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 815-16 (11th Cir. 1987) (relying on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in concluding that deliberate indifference
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feature of this test is its objectivity and use of the "reasonable
person" standard to assess an individual's culpability. The
second approach was to borrow the concept of criminal
recklessness. The essence of criminal recklessness is that it
requires subjective proof of a conscious disregard of the risk of
harm2 44 or evidence that an act is so dangerous that the
defendant's knowledge of the risk can be inferred.24
The Supreme Court clarified the meaning of deliberate
indifference in Farmer v. Brennan,46  another Eighth
Amendment case. There, the Court considered a
requires a showing "that the defendants either had actual knowledge of a
substantial risk or had knowledge of facts that would indicate this risk to any
reasonable person"); Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495-96 (10th
Cir. 1990) (holding that an Eighth Amendment violation occurs when an official
"disregards a known or obvious risk that is very likely to result in the violation
of a prisoner's constitutional rights"); Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 17-18 (1st
Cir. 1989) (holding that common law tortious recklessness could constitute a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause). The Ninth
Circuit held that gross negligence ("the want of even scant care or an extreme
departure from the ordinary standard of conduct") could be sufficient to give
rise to a constitutional violation. See Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857
F.2d 638, 641-42 (9th Cir. 1988).
244. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.20(2)(c):
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known
to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation.
245. The Seventh Circuit embraced criminal recklessness as the definition of
deliberate indifference in Eighth Amendment cases in Duckworth v. Franzen,
780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985). The Seventh Circuit referred to the
recklessness required to prove second-degree murder, i.e., a defendant choking a
victim with the intent to harm but not kill, and the victim dies. See id. This
approach was criticized by the Tenth Circuit in Berry, where the court of
appeals advocated the application of common law tort recklessness and noted
that the Seventh Circuit had chosen the highest level of criminal recklessness
possible. See Berry, 900 F.2d at 1495 n.7.
246. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
247. However, it is unclear from Farmer which approach ultimately wins out.
See Heather M. Kinney, The "Deliberate Indifference" Test Defined, 5 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 121 (1995). On one hand, the Court repeatedly stated
that it was setting forth a subjective test. See, e.g., Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845,
848. On the other hand, the Court observed that in some circumstances, "a
factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from
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transsexual prisoner's claim that prison officials violated the
Eighth Amendment by placing the prisoner in the general
population, where the prisoner was beaten and raped by
another inmate. Plaintiff argued that the objective test of
deliberate indifference (criminal recklessness), which the
Court used in Canton v. Harris48 to determine whether a
municipality could be liable for a constitutional violation,
should also be used to determine whether a constitutional
violation has in fact occurred. In a decision remanding the
case, the Court held that a prison official violates a prisoner's
rights "only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk
of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it."24 The Court explicitly
rejected the Canton objective test, stating that it was "not an
appropriate test for determining the liability of prison
officials under the Eighth Amendment.""'° Instead, the Court
conclusively established a subjective test for deliberate
indifference in Eighth Amendment cases.251
Despite the minor questions addressed in Farmer over
exactly what level of deliberate indifference is required under
particular circumstances and whether an objective or
subjective standard should apply, the deliberate indifference
test has generated little or no controversy. Since the
the very fact that the risk was obvious." Id. at 842. Thus, some objectivity
creeps into the Court's deliberate indifference test, despite its explicit disavowal
of the objective test. See Kinney, supra, at 135 ("Thus, it appears that a
prisoner must prove actual knowledge to satisfy the Court's deliberate
indifference test, yet he may lawfully prevail in the case without reaching that
level of proof if the fact finders infer knowledge from evidence of the
obviousness of the risk of harm.").
248. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
249. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
250. Id. at 841.
251. See, e.g., id. at 845, 848; see also S.S. v. McMullen, 186 F.3d 1066 (8th
Cir. 1999), vacated by 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24361 (8th Cir. Sept. 30, 1999).
"Deliberate indifference" does not meaningfully differ from willful
recklessness, i.e., wherein the actor responds unreasonably to a
substantial and known risk rather than to a risk of which the actor
merely should have known. By contrast, so-called "civil recklessness"
or "gross negligence" may exist when the risk of harm is so obvious that
the actor should have known about it even if he or she did not actually
know about it.
Id. at 1074 n.8 (citations omitted).
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deliberate indifference test was established in Estelle, it has
been applied by courts on a regular basis in the Eighth
Amendment context, in the numerous cases filed by prisoners
alleging failure to provide medical assistance, deprivations of
property, and failure to ensure prisoner safety. A large body
of case law has developed that has elaborated on the meaning
of deliberate indifference and its application in various
contexts. The orderly development of deliberate indifference
as a dependable, easily applied standard contrasts sharply
with the tumultuous history of the shocks the conscience test.
Borrowing the deliberate indifference test from the
Eighth Amendment is far less problematic than the Lewis
court's wholesale importation of the Eighth Amendment
analysis into the Fourteenth Amendment.25  Deliberate
indifference is merely a discrete standard of culpability, not
an entire analytical framework, and its use in the Fourteenth
Amendment is completely distinct from its use in the prison
setting. Furthermore, the use of deliberate indifference
across the board avoids the problems of deciding when the
circumstances are exigent enough to justify the application of
a higher level of culpability, such as intent, and it moves
away from the confusion attendant to the shocks the
conscience test. That said, the deliberate indifference test is
no cakewalk for plaintiffs. To the contrary, the subjective test
of deliberate indifference set forth in Farmer is a formidable
hurdle for any plaintiff. A plaintiff must somehow show what
was going on inside the head of the state actor and prove that
the actor knew of the particular risk to which the plaintiff
was subjected, or that the risk was patently obvious to the
actor. Beyond unlikely admissions in depositions or other
personal admissions by state actors, plaintiffs have little hope
of happening upon evidence of such knowledge at the proper
level of particularity.252
252. See discussion supra Part II.A.
253. The level of particularity presents the greatest problem for plaintiffs. It
is not enough for a plaintiff to prove that a state actor knew car chases were
dangerous in general; a plaintiff must show that the officer actually knew the
particular plaintiff was very likely to be hurt by this particular chase but
ignored that risk. It is not enough for a prisoner to show that a prison official
knew she was in danger in general; the prisoner must show the prison official in
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C. Consonance with the Fourteenth Amendment
Even more important than the clarity, reliable
background, and selectivity of the deliberate indifference
standard is its consonance with the Fourteenth Amendment.
Throughout the history of the Supreme Court's struggles with
the concept of due process, the Court has characterized the
Due Process Clause as a constitutional bulwark against the
"arbitrary exercise" of governmental power."" As the majority
in Lewis put it, "We have emphasized time and again that
'the touchstone of due process is protection of the individual
against arbitrary action of government."' 55 In Collins and
numerous prior cases, the buzz word for the Fourteenth
Amendment has not been shocks the conscience, but
"arbitrary."56
In Lewis, the majority chose to equate "arbitrary" with
"shocks the conscience," holding that "only the most egregious
official conduct can be said to be 'arbitrary in the
constitutional sense."' 57 This may not have been a logical
leap, particularly when one considers the closeness of the
concepts of "arbitrariness" and "deliberate indifference." In
both Collins and Lewis, the Court failed to explain the
meaning of "arbitrary," the term it deemed so central to the
Due Process Clause. Black's Law Dictionary offers this
definition:
In an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously
or at pleasure. Without adequate determining principle;
not founded on the nature of things; nonrational; not done
or acting according to reason or judgment; depending on
the will alone; absolutely in power; capriciously;
tyrannical; despotic. Without fair, solid, and substantial
fact knew of a particular threat against the prisoner and did nothing about it.
254. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1321 (3d Cir. 1994) (Cowen,
J., dissenting) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992); Regents of the
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some
Confusions about Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 325 (1993)).
255. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (quoting Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)); see also Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992).
256. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845 (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 129).
257. Id. (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 129).
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cause; that is, without cause based upon the law. Willful
and unreasoning action, without consideration and regard
for facts and circumstances presented.' 58
Under this definition, arbitrariness is not a proxy for
intent or maliciousness, as suggested in Lewis. Rather, the
definition intimates that arbitrariness is far closer to the
concept of wantonness; that is, taking an action without
regard for the possible harmful consequences. At worst,
under this definition, arbitrary action is conduct with actual
knowledge or sufficient information from which one could or
should have known of the potential for harm or injury. Thus,
under its most common definition, the concept of "arbitrary"
falls far short of intent, and is more closely related to
recklessness and deliberate indifference in that it involves
conduct with knowledge of potential harm.
Even if arbitrariness was considered a proxy for intent,
courts have held that the tort equivalent of deliberate
indifference, recklessness, is a form of wrongful intent."9
Deliberate indifference is, essentially, "an intent to place a
person unreasonably at risk,"60 which is shown when a state
actor "was aware of a known or obvious risk that was so great
that it was highly probable that serious harm would follow
and he or she proceeded in conscious and unreasonable
disregard of the consequences."26 1  Because deliberate
indifference is a form of intent, it is unclear why it would be
insufficient to meet the test of "arbitrary in the constitutional
sense."
The Lewis majority did not explain why the word
arbitrary should have any different meaning in the
constitutional setting than in any other setting, other than to
advance Justice Marshall's famous non sequitur that "it is a
constitution we are expounding." 62  The substitution of the
258. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 104 (6th ed. 1991).
259. See, e.g., Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Medina v.
City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992)); Fagan, 22
F.3d at 1324 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (citing Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d
1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989)).
260. Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 574.
261. Id.
262. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
504 [Vol. 41
CONFUSING PURSUITS
shocks the conscience test as the "touchstone" of due process
seems unnecessary in light of the fact that the term arbitrary
has a clear meaning, while shocks the conscience, as
discussed above, defies definition. Furthermore, the
additional step of substituting "intent to injure" and
"deliberate indifference" for shocks the conscience, depending
on the circumstances, takes the Court further afield from the
clear meaning of arbitrary. The close definitional nexus
between the core concept of due process, arbitrary action, and
deliberate indifference and reckless disregard makes
deliberate indifference the better choice to guide the inquiry
in the due process setting.
The deliberate indifference test outlined by the Supreme
Court in Farmer offers a clear and demanding threshold of
culpability that has proved workable in the Eighth
Amendment setting. It is a threshold that, if clearly
articulated, could have allowed the Court to remove itself
from the subjective mire of the shocks the conscience test in
Lewis. But the relative ease and clarity with which the
deliberate indifference test could be applied in the Fourteenth
Amendment context is not the most compelling reason for its
application to substantive due process claims. The most
compelling reason to apply the deliberate indifference test to
substantive due process claims is that it is the measure of
culpability most consistent with the Court's prior Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence and with the essence of
substantive due process. The Court should have gone with
deliberate indifference across the board in Lewis. Instead,
the Court thrust substantive due process into yet another
tailspin.
VII. CONCLUSION
Though Judge Cowen penned the prescient words that
began this article four years prior to the Lewis decision, he
aptly describes the effect of Lewis.63 Lewis indeed has the
263. See Fagan, 22 F.3d at 1319 (Cowen, J., dissenting) ("It thus appears that
the Constitution does not constrain police officers when conducting a high-speed
car chase. The decision of the court today will have the practical effect of
immunizing reckless police conduct from all strictures of the Constitution, so
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effect of immunizing the reckless conduct of police officers in
the all-too-common circumstance of police chases. This,
however, is just the beginning of the problematic implications
of the Lewis decision.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lewis for the
purpose of resolving a conflict among the circuits over the
minimum threshold of culpability required to violate
substantive due process in a police pursuit."4 As discussed
above, the majority opinion conflates the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, rests its analysis on a threshold
that has been heavily criticized, and creates an opening that
gives lower courts carte blanche in choosing among the
majority and concurring opinions. Moreover, the majority
produced an opinion that has the possible effect of removing
police pursuit cases from the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment altogether.
Instead of limiting its analysis to the police-pursuit issue,
the Court went further, setting forth an analysis intended to
cover all substantive due process cases arising out of conduct
by the executive branch. The Lewis majority's analysis,
bogged down by the malleability of the shocks the conscience
standard, adds multiple levels of judicial gloss, sowing
confusion where it sought to bring clarity. The confusion
among the lower courts that have struggled with Lewis
reflects the severe turmoil within the Lewis decision itself.
As discussed above, the Lewis decision did not have to be as
conflicted as it was.
Beyond the confusion, the real casualty of Lewis is
substantive due process itself. Over the years, the bell has
tolled more than once for the concept of "unenumerated
rights" in the form of substantive due process and
commentators have penned obituaries upon its first and
second "deaths."65 Yet somehow, the belief that the due
process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
something more than mere procedural rights has survived
long as no search or seizure occurs.").
264. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 839 (1998).
265. See David 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62
IND. L.J. 215 (1987).
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and stumbled, flourished and faltered, confounding both its
advocates and detractors.
Such a tumultuous history is bound to take its toll.
Following closely on the heels of the Court's thorough but
conflicted surgery on substantive due process in the
legislative setting in Glucksberg, the Court sliced open
substantive due process again in Lewis with, as discussed
above, extraordinarily dubious results. Such a clumsy
treatment of an area of the law that cries out for clarity is as
unfortunate as it is avoidable. The prognosis for executive
misconduct lawsuits invoking the substantive protections of
the Due Process Clause in the wake of Lewis appears dim. At
the very least, the decision portends yet another bruising
jurisprudential struggle over the present and future of
"unenumerated rights" under the U.S. Constitution.
The night of Philip Lewis's fateful motorcycle ride,
Deputy Smith made a number of choices that led to the
evening's tragic outcome. He gave chase to two youths who
had done nothing more than shout an obscenity and refuse to
stop when asked. He pursued the two helmetless boys at
great speeds in a chase fraught with obvious perils and near
accidents. He crested a hill blindly at a velocity that
rendered his efforts to avoid Philip Lewis futile.
Unquestionably, these facts were enough for a reasonable
jury to find that Deputy Smith was deliberately indifferent to
the rights of Philip Lewis.
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to let a jury decide the
case. Instead, they set the bar for Fourteenth Amendment
cases so high that plaintiffs like the Lewis family will have
scant opportunity to prove that an executive actor violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. In the wake of the Court's
decision, not only will a police officer chasing a fleeing suspect
never be liable under the Fourteenth Amendment unless he
meant to hit the fleeing suspect, but more gravely, no
executive actor acting under pressure will be liable unless he
actually and subjectively intended to harm someone.
Moreover, Lewis leaves a number of fundamental questions
about the Fourteenth Amendment unanswered and raises
countless new questions that are bound to occupy the Court
in coming years. Thus, despite its efforts to reduce the
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confusion among courts considering police pursuit cases, the
Supreme Court transformed the analysis of Fourteenth
Amendment actions against executive officials into a
confusing pursuit all its own.
